Liquidity facilities and signaling by Arregui, Nicolás
Liquidity Facilities and Signaling
by
Nicolas Arregui
Postgrado en Economia, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella (2004)
Licenciatura en Economfa, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella (2002)
Submitted to the Department of Economics
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics
at the
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
September 2010
ARCHIVES
MASSACHIE7S INSTITUTE
OC 08 2rA
@ Nicolas Arregui, MMX. All rights reserved.
The author hereby grants to Massachusetts Institute of Technology permission to
reproduce and
to distribute copies of this thesis document in whole or in part.
Signature of Author .............
Certified by..............
C1 ~ 
t
Department of Economics
5 August 2010
Guido Lorenzoni
Pentti Kouri Associate Professor of Economics
Main Advisor
erime by ...........
Ricardo Caballero
Ford International Professor of Economics, Macroeconomics and International Finance
Advisor
Certified by .......
C\
y .......------ ....------.Francesco Giavazzi
Professor of Economics
Advisor
A ccepted by . . .... W. . . . ....... -- .-.-.-. ......
A e bEsther Duflo
Abdul Latif Jameel Professor of Poverty Alleviation and Development Economics
Chairman, Departmental Committe on Graduate Studies
Liquidity Facilities and Signaling
by
Nicolds Arregui
Submitted to the Department of Economics
on 5 August 2010, in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics
Abstract
This dissertation studies the role of signaling concerns in discouraging access to liquidity facil-
ities like the IMF contingent credit lines (CCL) and the Discount Window (DW).
In Chapter 1, I analyze the introduction of IMF CCL in an economy with asymmetric
information and financial frictions. Countries have private information about the probability
of a being hit by a negative aggregate shock. IMF insurance provides outside liquidity that
partially alleviates financial frictions. In the absence of IMF CCL, weak countries face inefficient
project termination when the economy is hit by the negative shock, but receive cheaper credit
ex ante as they are pooled with strong countries. Once contingent credit lines are introduced,
weak countries have to choose between reducing inefficient liquidation and losing the ex ante
cross subsidy from pooling. Introducing the CCL leads to a Pareto improvement relative to the
no-IMF benchmark only if the IMF can offer a sufficiently large amount of outside liquidity or
if it can allow for cross subsidization from strong to weak countries.
Chapter 2 studies the role of eligibility requirements that make the CCL close to a rating
agency. Risk-averse countries, with private information regarding the probability of being hit
by an aggregate income shock, seek insurance in international capital markets. I focus on
a No-IMF benchmark in which the target economies for the facility manage to separate from
weaker countries by underinsuring. I model IMF CCL as the introduction of an imperfect stress
test that countries may voluntarily take. If the stress test is good enough, the IMF generates a
Pareto improvement by providing target economies with a cheaper way to separate from weaker
economies. However, if the quality of the stress test is low enough, there exists an equilibrium in
which no country chooses to take the exam. Provided that the cost of the exam is low enough,
I show that forcing all countries to take the exam Pareto dominates the equilibrium in which
no country takes the exam.
In Chapter 3, I study the role of the DW in the presence of competing liquidity facilities with
market determined interest rates. There is stigma attached to borrowing at the DW. Stigma
costs are assumed to be fixed costs and therefore banks borrow at the DW only when the fed
funds market is severely tight. A more attractive discount window (lower discount rate or lower
signaling costs) results in higher total DW borrowing and a higher fraction of banks borrowing
from the facility. It is also accessed in more states of the world. I propose an empirical approach
based on cross-district data to test for the stigma hypothesis.
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Chapter 1
Signaling Concerns and IMF
Contingent Credit Lines
Abstract
Emerging market economies are exposed to significant macroeconomic risk. In-
ternational reserves can be accumulated for self-insurance but this entails substan-
tial costs. The IMF contingent credit line facility constitutes an attempt to provide
a more efficient insurance mechanism. However, no country found the early ver-
sions of the facility attractive. This paper studies the role of signaling concerns in
discouraging access to contingent credit lines. I analyze the introduction of IMF
contingent credit lines in an economy with asymmetric information and financial
frictions. Asymmetric information is present because countries differ in the prob-
ability of a negative aggregate shock, and this probability is private information.
The financial frictions originate from the limited ability of lenders to commit fu-
ture resources. IMF insurance provides outside liquidity that partially alleviates
this commitment problem. In the absence of IMF credit lines, weak countries face
inefficient project termination when the economy is hit by the negative shock, but
receive cheaper credit ex ante as they are pooled with strong countries (cross sub-
sidization). Once contingent credit lines are introduced, applying for a credit line
can reveal information. Then weak countries have to choose between reducing in-
efficient liquidation and losing the ex ante cross subsidy from pooling. Introducing
IMF credit lines leads to a Pareto improvement relative to the no-IMF benchmark
only if the IMF can offer a sufficiently large amount of outside liquidity or if it can
allow for cross subsidization from strong to weak countries.
1.1 Introduction
The IMF established the Contingent Credit Lines (CCL) in 1999 to "help countries with strong
policies avoid contagion crises". The basic idea of the program was to increase ex ante eligibility
requirements in exchange for reduced ex post conditionality, so that periods of exceptional
financial pressure in the capital account could be met with higher "automaticity" of funds.
However, the CCL expired in 2003 without having been used. The same fate was suffered by
its successor, the Short Term Liquidity Facility (SLF) introduced in October 2008. It was not
until the introduction of the Flexible Credit Lines in 2009 that the IMF managed to attract
countries to join the program.
During the very same period, emerging economies (the target of this IMF facility) increas-
ingly self-insured through the accumulation of international reserves. Cordella and Levy Yeyati
(2005) report that reserve hoarding as a fraction of GDP increased from 8.9% in 1992 to 18.1%
in 2002 in their sample of 35 emerging economies. Even when optimally managed, this option
entails substantial costs (see Caballero and Panageas 2005a,b) and for this reason, external
insurance arrangements have been advocated as more efficient insurance mechanisms against
small probability events (such as large capital outflows). It has been argued that emerging
economies lack access to hedging and insurance instruments to guard against macroeconomic
shocks (aggregate uncertainty). The question addressed in this paper is: why did under-insured
economies refuse to accept the IMF liquidity provision?
A lesson from the CCL experience is that the informational content of these liquidity agree-
ments is vital. Quoting IMF reports: "Potentially eligible countries were not confident that a
CCL would be viewed as a sign of strength rather than weakness", "Such request could convey a
signal of greater underlying vulnerabilities than the market had previously perceived (asymmet-
ric information)". This paper builds on the insight that whether countries decide to come to
the IMF or not has a lot to do with the image they want foreign investors to have about them.
Therefore, the underlying environment I consider has two crucial features: 1) borrowers desire
to secure liquidity in advance; and 2) there is unobservable borrower heterogeneity.
The basic framework adds heterogeneity into a variation of Holmstrom and Tirole's 1998
liquidity model. Countries need to borrow to make investments that may be hit by random
liquidity needs. Shocks are perfectly correlated, so there is macroeconomic uncertainty. A
fundamental financial friction is assumed: lenders cannot commit their future resources. As
a result, given limited pledgeability and the aggregate nature of the shock, in the absence of
outside liquidity all projects are liquidated in case of a shock.
I model IMF CCLs as insurance that may not be provided by private capital markets. The
idea is that the IMF is able to raise capital in situations in which capital markets cannot or
do not want to, ex post.' In terms of the assumed financial friction, the provision of outside
liquidity by the IMF solves the commitment problem of the lenders. I consider the case in
which IMF outside liquidity provision is limited in size. In the setting of the model, allocations
proposed by the IMF are implemented only if they Pareto dominate the no-IMF benchmark.
In a symmetric information scenario, in the absence of the IMF, liquidity shocks result
in inefficient liquidation of the projects. Any amount of outside liquidity that the IMF may
provide results in a Pareto improvement relative to the no-IMF situation.
The asymmetric information scenario consists of two types (strong, weak) that differ in the
probability of a liquidity shock, which is private information. In the absence of IMF credit
lines, contracts pool both types. Weak countries face inefficient project termination when the
economy is hit by the negative shock, but receive cheaper credit ex-ante as they are pooled with
the strong types (cross subsidization). I show that this pooling equilibrium maximizes utility
for the strong type when both types are creditworthy.
Once IMF contingent credit lines are introduced, applying for a credit line can reveal in-
formation. Whether the introduction of IMF CCLs results in a Pareto improvement relative
to the no-IMF benchmark (and therefore is implemented), depends crucially on two points: 1)
the amount of outside liquidity the IMF is able to provide in case of a shock; and 2) whether
insurance contracts with the IMF are required to break even type by type or in expectation.
Pareto improvements relative to the no IMF equilibrium require IMF interventions to be either
large in scale or to allow for cross subsidization from strong to weak countries.
The provision of outside liquidity by the IMF reduces the inefficiency associated with the
liquidation of positive net present value projects that results from the lack of commitment of
the lenders. The gain is proportional (in the relevant range) to the amount of outside liquidity
'For example, during the last global recession the leaders of the Group of 20 nations (G-20) announced a
tripling of the lending power of the IMF to around $750 billion (April 2009).
that the IMF may provide. If the contracts signed with the IMF are required to break even type
by type, it implies that weak types lose the benefits from cross subsidization when revealing
their type. This loss for the weak types does not depend on the amount of outside liquidity
the IMF provides. This is the key trade off driving the results. The informational content
of insurance provision (signaling story), interacts with the terms (e.g. size) of the liquidity
agreement. IMF insurance contracts that are required to break even type by type do not allow
for a Pareto improvement (relative to the no IMF equilibrium) when the amount of outside
liquidity is limited in size.
If contracts are required to break even in expectation instead of type by type, the introduc-
tion of the credit lines can generate a Pareto improvement relative to the no-IMF benchmark
irrespective of the amount of outside liquidity provision. For limited supply of outside liquidity,
cross subsidization in insurance contracts is strictly required.
I expand the basic setting in three directions. First I study the consequences of liquidity
provision on crisis prevention effort by debtor countries. The size of the liquidity provision in
case of a shock matters in two respects: it determines whether the IMF may induce separation
of types or not, and conditional on separation it affects the optimal choice of effort. As a
result, optimal crisis prevention effort has a non-monotone relationship with IMF liquidity
provision. For intermediate size liquidity provision, effort choice increases relative to the no-
IMF benchmark.
Second, I use the framework to discuss an alternative (and possibly complementary) sig-
naling story. The model in this paper is centered around the "upward" concern that taking
the CCL might reveal the country is not as good as the market had previously expected. The
alternative signaling story focuses on the "downward" concern about being confused with a
worse type. Not taking the contingent credit lines is a costly action that may enable the target
economies of this facility to credibly signal they are better than other countries.
Finally, I introduce an inefficient storage technology in the basic setting in order to relate
the model to the ongoing debate on inefficient reserve accumulation. I show that contingent
credit lines that are too small, too narrow or not cross subsidized enough become less attractive
relative to reserve hoarding, and might end up not being used if their signaling content is higher
than the one of reserves.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2 I introduce the model and review the
symmetric information benchmark with and without the presence of the IMF. In section 3 I
analyze the asymmetric information case without the IMF. Section 4 introduces the IMF in
the asymmetric information context. I analyze the case in which IMF contracts are required
to break even type by type and in expectation. In section 5 I use the model to analyze the
effects of IMF intervention on crisis prevention effort by weak countries. Section 6 compares
the results to an alternative signaling story. In section 7 I relate the model to the debate on
inefficient international reserve hoarding by emerging countries; and section 8 concludes. All
proofs are in the appendix.
1.1.1 Relation to the literature
There exists a large literature analyzing the consequences of financial frictions for economies fac-
ing macroeconomic risk (aggregate uncertainty). Following Holmstrom and Tirole (1996, 1998),
and similar to Caballero and Krishnamurty (2002a-b), Caballero and Panageas (2005a-b) and
Lorenzoni (2007), this paper assumes financial frictions both on the borrowers' (countries) and
on the lenders' (international capital markets) side. Also in line with these papers, aggregate
uncertainty is modeled as perfectly correlated exogenous shocks hitting investment projects.
The main contribution of this paper to this strand of literature is the introduction of an infor-
mational friction at the contracting stage. This paper studies the challenges faced by a provider
of outside liquidity (e.g. the IMF) under asymmetric information.
A number of papers study the role of the IMF when countries are heterogeneous and country
types are private information. Marchesi and Thomas (1999) analyze IMF conditionality as a
costly action that enables stronger countries to credibly signal their type. In Arregui (2008) the
IMF has an advantage relative to the market in extracting private information from countries.
As such, eligibility requirements are presented as an imperfect stress test that countries may
voluntarily take or not. None of those papers focuses on the role of the IMF as a lending
institution. More relatedly, this paper shares with Basu (2009) the idea that contracts signed
with the IMF may reveal information to private capital markets and this should be incorporated
in the mechanism design problem of the IMF. In Basu's paper there is no ex ante heterogeneity
and the IMF advantage is to commit to redistributive transfers across types ex post. In this
paper, it is crucial that there is heterogeneity at the contracting stage and the IMF may not
be able to cross subsidize types.
This paper is also related to the strand of literature that analyzes the moral hazard conse-
quences of IMF lending. The standard concern is that IMF lending, by making crisis scenarios
less unattractive, may discourage crisis prevention effort by the debtor country. Several au-
thors have considered settings under which the relationship between IMF lending and effort
provision is not unambiguous. Jeanne arid Zettlemeyer (2004) consider a setting in which the
introduction of the IMF expands pledgeable income. Morris and Shin (2006) study the role
of the IMF as a provider of catalytic finance. Basu (2009) concludes that IMF interventions
can ameliorate the moral hazard problem ex ante. In line with those papers, in the setting I
consider there is a non monotone relationship between country effort choice and IMF provision
of outside liquidity.
Finally, this paper contributes to the literature on inefficient international reserve accumu-
lation. Caballero and Panageas (2005b) stress the substantial costs associated with the use
of reserve accumulation as a self insurance mechanism. In their paper, external insurance is
hard to obtain because during sudden stops investors themselves are in distress. Caballero and
Panageas (2005a) and Borerisztein and Mauro (2003) propose ways of improving the self insur-
ance strategy. In this paper, the IMF constitutes an alternative provider of external insurance
that may hoard capital when private capital markets can not. I show how signaling concerns
may favour the use of reserve accumulation in spite of the associated efficiency costs.
1.2 The Model
The basic environment is similar to Holmstrom and Tirole's (1998) liquidity model. There are
two agents: the country and the international lenders (the IMF will be introduced later). There
are 3 periods t = 0, 1, 2. At date 0 the country has access to a continuum of projects of fixed
size I, has wealth A < I, and must borrow I - A.
At date 1, an additional, uncertain reinvestment p is required in order to continue the
project and realize the final payoffs. If the amount is not paid the project terminates and yields
nothing (i.e. the liquidation value of the project is zero). The reinvestment need follows
t=O t=1 t=2
Borrow: I-A
FundspAReturn:Zi Pledgeable: Zo
0 Z,>p>Z
Figure 1-1: Timeline.
a binomial distribution: with probability A continuation requires reinvesting p > 0 and with
probability 1 - A there is no reinvestment requirement (no shock). The shock p is perfectly
correlated across projects (macroeconomic uncertainty) and is observable and verifiable.
At date 2, if the project gets to completion it yields Z 1. A financial friction on the borrowers'
side is assumed: borrowers are unable to pledge all the benefits from investment to investors.
Only a fraction of the project can be valued and seized in default, generating a wedge between
the total returns to the project Z1 and what can be pledged to investors Zo. I call Zo "pledgeable
income". Assume Z1 > p > Zo, that is, continuation in case of a shock has negative net present
value (NPV) from the point of view of the lenders but positive NPV for the country. Countries
are assumed to be risk neutral.
Lenders are risk neutral and require a zero rate of return. A financial friction on the lenders'
side is assumed: lenders cannot commit their future resources. There is no storage technology
from period 0 to 1. These two assumptions limit the ability of the country to insure ex ante
against aggregate shocks.
Assume each project has positive present value even if it is terminated every time it is hit by
a shock, i.e. (1 - A) Z1 > I. Also, assume that lenders would be willing to finance each project
even with certain continuation (if they could commit their future income): Zo - Ap > I - A.
Condition 1 Assume (1 - A) Zi > I.
Condition 2 Assume Zo - Ap > I - A.
Under the proposed setting, liquidity shocks must result in liquidation of the projects. The
reason for liquidation is that when funds p are required, the country does not have the funds
(no storage technology between 0 and 1) and the projects have negative net present value from
the point of view of the lenders (p > Zo). The aggregate nature of the shock implies there are
no assets to back up investors' promises to cover a liquidity shock. The only option is for all
projects to shut down.
Ideally, the country would like to pledge additional funds in the good state to compensate
for the negative net present value reinvestments by the lenders in case of a shock, and allow
for some continuation. Given our second assumption, there is enough pledgeable income in
expectation to attain full continuation in case of a shock. However, such agreements are not
possible because the lenders cannot commit to provide the funds ex post.
1.2.1 What can the IMF do that private capital markets cannot?
I assume that the IMF is able to commit resources up-to L in case of a shock. In this way I
intend to capture the idea that the IMF may be able to raise funds in situations in which private
capital markets cannot or do not want to, ex post. I do not go into the detailed mechanics
of how the IMF raises liquidity, but acknowledging it is a complicated process I parameterize
the scope of insurance that the IMF may provide by the parameter L (the most the IMF may
commit to pay in case of a shock).
In terms of the model, the IMF (partially) solves the commitment problem of the lenders
that lies at the heart of the inefficient liquidation of projects. It allows the country to insure
against aggregate liquidity shocks across states of nature, allowing for some projects not to be
liquidated in case of a shock. Note that the IMF is not assumed to expand pledgeable income
as in Jeanne and Zettlemeyer (2004). In this paper, the IMF relaxes the financial friction on
the lender's side, not on the borrower's side.
The emerging economies that were the target of the CCL facility have been vastly argued to
be under-insured as a result of lacking hedging and insurance instruments (e.g. see Caballero
2003). In this paper, I model IMF CCLs as insurance instruments that countries may not access
in private capital markets. It is not the purpose of this paper to argue the reasons why the
IMF has such an advantage over private capital markets.2 This stark characterization of the
2For example. Holmstrom and Tirole 1998 argue that the ability of governments to commit future income of
unborn citizens using taxation represents a clear advantage over private capital markets. We may think of the
IMF as coordinated government intervention.
role of the IMF makes it challenging to explain why emerging economies did not take on the
liquidity provision by the IMF.
1.2.2 Symmetric Information benchmark
In this section I consider the symmetric information scenario. There are three main features
that should be held in mind: the liquidity shock is aggregate (macroeconomic uncertainty),
reinvestments are not self financing (p > Zo) and lenders cannot commit their future income.
The IMF is interpreted as a provider of outside liquidity, that (partially) solves the lack of
commitment problem by the lenders.3
Call L the maximum amount the IMF can commit to deliver in case of a shock. The case
L = 0 corresponds to the no-IMF scenario.
Without loss of generality, let contracts specify a payment to the lenders in case of shock
and no shock (P, and P, respectively) and a probability of continuation in case of a shock x
(which may also be interpreted as a downsizing of the project) and liquidity provision in case
of a shock L. The optimal contract for the country maximizes utility
(1 - A) (Z1 - P) + Ax (Z - Ps)-A (1.1)
subject to the break even constraint for the lenders,
(1 - A) Pas + Ax (Ps - p) > I -A (1.2)
the continuation constraint,
x (p - Ps) < L (1.3)
the limited outside liquidity constraint,
L < L (1.4)
"Equivalently we may think of the IMF as the introduction of a storage technology that delivers one unit at
t 1 for each unit purchased at t = 0. The storage technology has a maximum of L.
and limited pledgeability and feasibility of the liquidation policy constraints,
Pi < Zo i = 8, ns (1.5)
0 < X<1
As it is shown in the appendix, lenders will just break even and countries will earn the net
present value of the project. The net present value of the project is increasing in the probability
of continuation in case of a shock.4 Countries will choose the highest x subject to the rest of
constraints.
Given the assumption that Zo - Ap > I - A (condition 2), in case there is sufficient outside
liquidity L > p - Zo it will allow for full continuation in case of a shock x 1 and the payments
to the lender Pi < Zo i = s, ns will be such that it just breaks even.
(1 - A) P 5 + Ax (P. - p) = I - A
The country gets the NPV of the project
U = Z1 - Ap - I
However, if outside liquidity provision is insufficient L < p - Zo, there will be inefficient
liquidation of projects.
Proposition 3 If L < p - Zo, the optimal contract for the country involves liquidation of
projects given by
p - Zo <
The payments to the lender are P, = Zo, and P = I-A+AL < Zo . The case L 0 corresponds1-A -
to the no-IMF scenario.
Lenders break even and countries get the net present value of the project, which is affected
"Here I present the results for the case A > 0. If A = 0, outside liquidity provision is irrelevant. The payment
to the lender is P, = I - A and the country gets the net present value of the project Z1 - I.
by inefficient liquidation
Us = (1 - A) Z1 + A (Z1 - P) -I
p - Zo
There are several ways to implement this allocation. For instance, countries may sign a
funding contract with capital markets that provides I - A in exchange for a payment -A in
case of no shock. And an insurance contract with the IMF that provides A if there is no
shock, in exchange for liquidity provision L if there is a shock. If there is a shock, the country
will commit pledgeable income Zo to maximize continuation.
In the no-IMF scenario (L = 0) all projects are liquidated in case of a shock. The intro-
duction of the IMF (0 < L < p - Zo) results in a strict Pareto improvement relative to the
no IMF situation (L = 0), since it reduces inefficient liquidation and increases the value of the
project (note the probability of continuation x and the NPV of the project are increasing in L
in the range [0, p - Zo]). It should be noted that this inefficient liquidation is a consequence of
the limited outside liquidity. As it is shown in the appendix, in the case expected pledgeable
income does not allow for full continuation in case of a shock5 (Zo - Ap < I - A < (1 - A) Zo)
there is an extra source of inefficiency arising from limited pledgeability that makes countries
reduce scale (lower x) to get funding.
1.3 Country types
Assume there are two types of countries OB E {g - ood, b - ad}. Types are unobservable. Let -y
be the fraction of good types. Good and bad countries differ in the probability of a liquidity
shock: AV < A b < 1. Furthermore, I make the extreme assumption that good types do not suffer
liquidity shocks Ag = 0. This implies that these types do not benefit directly from IMF liquidity
provision.
The asymmetric information scenario requires us to specify many more details than in the
symmetric information case. In particular, we need to specify what the benchmark is in the
absence of the IMF, we need to specify if the break even constraint is required to hold type
5Note that condition 2 rules this case out.
by type or in expectation, and we need to specify the conditions under which an allocation
proposed by the IMF is implemented or not.
In this section I characterize the no-IMF benchmark. I focus initially on financial contracts
that specify a payment P to the lender in case of completion (notice that in the absence of IMF
liquidity, completion happens only when there is no shock).6 I consider richer contracts later in
the section. In the next section I introduce the IMF into the asymmetric information setting.
1.3.1 No IMF benchmark
For the same reasons explained in the symmetric information case, in the absence of the IMF,
liquidity shocks result in liquidation of the projects.7 Assume that the only feasible financial
contracts are contracts that specify a payment P to the lender in case of completion in exchange
for initial funds I - A. By inspection of the incentive compatibility constraints,
Z 1 -P 9 -A > Z 1 -Pb- A
(1-A)(Z-Pb) -A 2 (1-A)(Zi- Pg)-A
we conclude that the considered contracts necessarily pool the 2 types (P = P = P). Each
type prefers financing to no financing and conditional on funding, a lower value for P. I require
P to just break even for the lenders and to satisfy limited pledgeability P < Zo.
I take this allocation to be the no IMF benchmark (or equilibrium). This allocation is the
only (PBE) equilibrium contract that just breaks even in the following two stage game: in the
first stage, the borrower proposes a contract P; in the second stage, the lender updates beliefs
based on the observed proposal and accepts if and only if P < Zo and the expected value of
the payment P given the updated beliefs is at least I - A.'
Proposition 4 Under asymmetric information, the no-IMF equilibrium is characterized by
" More generally a contract could specify a probability of financing, a payment to the lender in case of financing
and completion, a payment to the lender in case of financing and not completion, a payment to the lender in
case of not financing (could be positive or negative, positive requires A > 0).
' This results follows from the fact that there is only one country with two types, i.e. types do not coexist.
Otherwise, the shock would not be an aggregate shock and weak types could attain some continuation by holding
stock in the good type's project (as in Holmstrom and Tirole 1996).
"This game has no separating equilibrium and multiple pooling equilibria P = P = P with I-A <
P < . Only when P 1-A lenders do not make positive profits in expectation.
Pg = P = P,
I-A I-A
A < P = Y + 1 -Y)( A) (1 - A)
Ex post there is cross subsidization, lenders make money on the good types and lose money
on the bad types. In the pooling equilibrium, the good type pays more to lenders than what
he would under symmetric information. The opposite is true for the weak type. The size of the
cross subsidy to the bad type is increasing in the proportion of good types -Y.
From the point of view of the bad countries, the absence of outside liquidity results in
inefficient project termination when a shock occurs; however, it results in a pooling equilibrium
that entails cross subsidies from the strong types. This cross subsidization will be at the core
of the results in the next section.
I will work under the assumption that Z1 - p > I - A. This means that the utility for the
weak type when pooling with the strong type for any -y is lower than what he would obtain in
the symmetric information case with sufficient liquidity provision (L > p - Zo). 9
Condition 5 Assume Z1 - p > I - A.
1.3.2 Richer contracts
So far we have restricted attention to contracts that specify a payment to the lender in case
of completion (no liquidity shock). Could the countries do better by signing more general
contracts? In more generality a contract may specify a probability of financing xi, a payment
to the lender in case of financing and no shock R and a payment to the borrower in case of no
financing -R9. Note that given the aggregate nature of the shocks and the requirement that
international lenders must back their promises by assets (and assuming no outside liquidity)
contracts may not specify a probability of continuation in case of a liquidity shock, nor a
payment to the lenders in such case (since shock implies liquidation and there is limited liability).
Proposition 6 Assuming that both types are creditworthy ((1 - A) Z1 > I and Zo - Ap >
I - A) the pooling equilibrium maximizes utility for the good type out of the incentive compatible
"If they are granted access to enough outside liquidity (I > p - Zo) , there will be an efficiency gain of
A (Z1 - p), since projects now survive the liquidity shock with certainty. The maximum loss in cross subsidies
is given by (1 - A) [-A - (I - A)] = A (I - A).
allocations that break even in expectation and satisfy limited pledgeability.
That is, the best allocation for the strong type entails cross subsidies to the weak type. The
intuition is that when both types are creditworthy, lending is efficient and any other (reasonable)
contract we consider will amount to a redistribution of wealth between the good and bad types.
A contract that pays only in case of no shock minimizes the cross subsidy to the weak type,
since it best reflects the comparative advantage of the good type.
1.4 Asymmetric information and the IMF
I now analyze the introduction of the IMF in the context of asymmetric information. The IMF
is able to commit funds up-to L in case of a shock. This advantage over private capital markets
could in principle allow for allocations that were not attainable in the absence of the IMF. I
study the behavior of the IMF as a mechanism design problem. I show that the introduction
of IMF CCLs may generate a Pareto improvement relative to the no-IMF equilibrium only if
the IMF can commit a sufficiently large amount of outside liquidity or if it can allow for cross
subsidization from strong to weak countries.
The IMF offers a pair of contracts (e9, cb) that satisfy limited pledgeability, continuation
and limited outside liquidity constraints. Without loss of generality, I restrict attention to
incentive compatible contracts. The mechanism design problem has two extra set of constraints:
participation and break even constraints. I turn in detail to each of these next.
A type that rejects the allocation proposed by the IMF may still go to the private capital
markets for funding. I assume that private capital markets do not find out about the IMF meet-
ing (in case of rejection) and therefore, the country may always obtain its no-IMF benchmark
allocation. In terms of the mechanism design problem, this means that an allocation will be
implemented as long as it generates a Pareto improvement relative to the no-IMF equilibrium
described in the previous section. There will be a participation constraint for each type.
How realistic is this assumption? Even when the formal procedure requires a country to
make the request for a CCL, it has been common practice for IMF officials to have informal and
confidential meetings with country representatives, out of which private markets do not seem
to learn much. For example, in the year 2000, the IMF staff conducted in depth assessments
for 15 countries against the eligibility criteria. 7 countries were identified as potentially eligible
and conversations between the candidates and IMF staff were held. This procedure was entirely
confidential, the results were not even shared with the IMF Board."'
Given that the IMF may commit funds (up-to L) in case of a shock, it is allowed to provide
insurance across states of the world. In the following subsections I consider two cases in turn :
in the first case contracts offered by the IMF (c9, cb) are required to break even type by type.
This means that contracts may shift resources across states of the world but not across different
types (unless c9 = cb) . In the second case, I require contracts offered by the IMF to break even
in expectation, that is, it may entail redistributions across types.
It is important to have in mind the kind of settings that would require contracts to break
even type by type versus in expectation. For simplicity, I have unified in the IMF the role
of funding and insurance provider. However, a natural division of tasks would be to have the
IMF providing insurance and capital markets providing funding." To highlight the fact that
insurance contracts signed with the IMF may reveal information to capital markets, consider
the timing: initially countries arrange liquidity provision with the IMF, the liquidity provision
arrangement is observable by private capital markets that provide funding for the projects. If
the insurance contract menu offered by the IMF has c9 $ c1b, private capital markets will learn
types before contracting for funding. If insurance contracts do not redistribute resources across
types and capital markets learn from the insurance agreement, cross subsidization across types
is shut down whenever c9 $ ceb. As in Basu (2009), the IMF mechanism design problem takes
into account that its policies affect information revelation in equilibrium.
The break even in expectation case requires insurance contracts to allow for resource redis-
tribution across types or require a higher degree of commitment from capital markets to break
even in expectation in the funding contracts once types have been revealed c9 # cb.12
"'The refusal to adopt a pure rules-based framework to assess eligibility (keep discretionality) and the refusal
to adopt systematic public assessments by the IMF Board of CCL eligibility, are other examples of practices that
make inference (at capital markets) when an agreement with the IMF is not reached more difficult.
The task division is based on the previous observation that the IMF CCLs are a sort of insurance that is not
available in private capital markets and on the fact that "The IMF lends to countries with balance of payments
difficulties. Unlike development banks, the IMF does not lend for specific projects", As a result, countries have
to deal with institutions other than the IMF to finance investment projects.
"It could also be attained by making insurance contracting with the IMF non transparent. Either by keeping
it confidential or, following Maskin and Tirole 1992, by offering each country a menu of contracts and having the
country to choose from the menu after signing funding contracts with Capital Markets. I find those alternatives
I identify the conditions under which the IMF may offer a pair of insurance contracts that
generates a Pareto improvement relative to the no-IMF equilibrium described in the previous
section. First, I solve the mechanism design problem when insurance contracts offered by the
IMF are required to break even type by type. Then I relax the requirement and allow them to
break even in expectation.
1.4.1 Type by type
Consider the case in which the insurance contracts offered by the IMF are required to break
even type by type. IMF contracts c = (P,,, P,, x', La) specify for each type i a payment P".
in case of no shock, a payment P4, a probability of continuation xi and liquidity provision L' in
case of a shock. No cross subsidization across types is allowed if cy $ cb. The IMF maximizes
its objective function subject to:
1. incentive compatibility constraints
Z1 -P,, - A > Z1 Pb - A
(1 )(Z-P +AxbZ 1 -P -A (Z - P) + Ax (Z - P,) - A
2. break even constraint. If cg $ cb
I - A < P9
I - A < (1 - A) Pb, + Axb pb
If c9 = cb
I - A < yPs + (1 -)[(1 - A) Pns + Ax (P, - p)]
attractive from a theoretical point of view, but it is not clear they constitute feasible policies for an institution
like the IMF.
3. limited pledgeability and feasibility of the liquidation policy constraints (for i = g, b)
P ,, Ps' < Zo;
0 < X <1
4. continuation constraint
xi (p - Pi) < L'
5. limited outside liquidity constraint
L' < L
6. Pareto improving relative to "no-IMF" equilibrium.
In the appendix I show how these constraints are obtained from the decentralized problem
in which countries agree first on liquidity provision from the IMF and later face private capital
markets to get funding.
I first restrict attention to pooling contracts. Clearly, the no-IMF equilibrium allocation
is still attainable. Any pooling contract specifying a positive probability of continuation will
require a higher payment in case of no shock. As a result, the good type's utility is maximized
by the pooling contract that allows for no continuation in case of a shock.
Proposition 7 No pooling contract c = c9 = Cb Pareto dominates the original no-IMF (pooling)
equilibrium.
Therefore, if there exists a contract that results in a Pareto improvement relative to the
no-IMF equilibrium, it has to induce separation of types. I turn now to separating contracts.
Consider the case in which outside liquidity provision is abundant (L = p - Zo) so we
may ignore the continuation and limited outside liquidity constraints. As we have assumed
1 > Ab > A9 = 0, giving each type its symmetric information payoff is incentive compatible
and breaks even type by type. Such allocation is the best separating allocation for the good
type, who is strictly better compared to the no-IMF benchmark. Also, under the assumption
Z1 -p > I A, the weak type prefers receiving the symmetric information benchmark allocation
with abundant liquidity (I = p - Zo) to the no-IMF benchmark for any value of - (which
indexes the size of the cross subsidy).13
Therefore, for L = p - Zo, the best separating allocation for the good type strictly (which
gives each type its symmetric information benchmark) Pareto dominates the no-IMF equilib-
rium. The basic idea is that there is enough outside liquidity to compensate the bad type (with
continuation in case of a shock) for the loss in cross subsidies. However, this is no longer the
case when outside liquidity is limited.
Proposition 8 Given that Z1 - p > I - A, and the requirement for contracts to break even
type by type,
" For not enough outside liquidity provision I c [0, Lmin] the introduction of the IMF does
not allow ,for allocations that Pareto dominate the original no-IMF (pooling) equilibrium.
" For sufficient outside liquidity provision L C (L"', p - Zo] the introduction of the IMF
allows for separating allocations that Pareto dominate the original no-IMF (pooling) equi-
libriun.
" The cutoff level of outside liquidity Lin is given by
min = 1 I -A( Zo)
y+ (1 - -y) (1 - A) Zi - p
Consider first the subset of the restrictions faced by the IMF that include: the break even
constraint, the continuation constraint and the limited pledgeability constraints for the bad
type together with the limited outside liquidity constraint given by:
Xb (P _pb)< L
xS - ,
The maximum level of utility that may be granted to the bad type subject to this group of
constraints was derived in section 2 and is given by
ub L
b (L) = (1 - A) Z1 + A - (Z1 - p) - I
"If the assumption Zi - p > I - A did not hold, the statement would still be true but only for a range of
values of 1.
Whenever L < L""A (p - Zo) the maximum utility that can be granted
to the bad type is less than what he obtains under the no-IMF equilibrium, and therefore, it is
impossible for the IMF to find a Pareto improvement.
The minimum level of liquidity required to generate a Pareto improvement relative to the
no-IMF benchmark (L"in) is increasing in y. The reason is that the cross subsidy when pooling
for the weak type is increasing in -y (and his symmetric information payoff is independent of
-y). The "proximity" of a crisis in the developed economies, captured by lower cross subsidies
to the weak type (lower -y) makes it easier to separate types. Also, Lmiin is increasing in the
size of the shock p and in the probability of the shock A. This is a consequence of the fact that
in this particular setting every shock results in liquidation in the absence of the IMF, In this
setting, the "proximity" of a crisis in the emerging economies (higher A or p) makes it harder
to separate types.
To complete the proof, we still have to show that for every L E (L""n, p - Zo] the IMF
can find contracts that Pareto dominate the no-IMF benchmark. Consider assigning all the
liquidity to the bad type and giving the bad type its symmetric information allocation (given
L E (0, p - Zo]). The bad type will then have continuation probability xb - L and paymentsp ZO
PA + Zl that yield utility level U(1 A) Z1 +A (Z 1  p) I.
We choose the allocation for the good type that maximizes his utility ZI - PnS - A subject
to the break even constraint for the good type
Pgs > I - A
the incentive compatibility constraint for the good type
(1 - A) (Z 1 - Pgs) + Ax9 (Z1 - Pg) - A < Ub (I)
and the limited pledgeability constraints for the good type Ps, P,9 < Zo0* < < 1.
The solution is given by xg = 0 and P9 s = max {I - A, - A L (Zi
satisfies the limited pledgeability constraint P19 < Zo. So
pnq s {I-A _A L Z1 - p)1-_A 1-A p-ZO k
I -A if L
- p)} which
if L c 10, Lj
L, p - zo
where L is given by
L = (p - Zo) < pZ1 - p
For each region, we need to verify if the proposed allocations satisfy the incentive compati-
bility constraint for the good type and if it yields a Pareto improvement relative to the no-IMF
equilibrium.
In the region [L, p Zol , the IC for the weak type is satisfied since
I-A
1-A
A -
+ L1-A
The allocations yield a higher payoff (than in the no-IMF equilibrium) to the good type
provided that
Z, - I> zi - I - AZ1-I Z 1 - I-A
S+ (1 - ) (1 - A)
which is always satisfied. The allocations yield a higher payoff (than in the no-IMF equilib-
rium) to the bad type provided that L> A (p - Zo) as was previously shown.
In the region L0, L , the IC for the weak type is satisfied since
I -A A L I-A A-P -A=A- (Z 1 -p)<P, - + Lns 1-A 1-Ap -Zo ~ " 1-A 1-A
The allocations yield a higher payoff (than in the no-IMF equilibrium) to the good type
provided that
A L
- (Z11-Ap-Zo
I-AA > Z I -A - A
~ y + (1--y) (1 -A)p) ), I -AZ1 -
which is satisfied as long as t > ~_^+4 (p - Zo), the same condition necessary
for the bad type to get more than under the no-IMF equilibrium.
Notice that in this region the break even constraint for the strong type is not binding
(Pl 5 > I - A). To achieve separation it is required that the good types leave some money on
the table. This is a costly action by the strong types to credibly signal their credentials.
1.4.2 In expectation
When contracts are required to break even in expectation instead of type by type, the mecha-
nism design problem for the IMF remains the same except for the break even constraint, that
is now given by
[I - A - P,9] + (1-) I - A - (1- A) P' - Ax bP - p) <0
Irrespective of the size of outside liquidity L the introduction of the IMF generates a Pareto
improvement relative to the no-IMF benchmark. Consider, for example, contracts that keep
the same cross subsidy from strong to weak types but also allow the weak type to purchase
insurance
P9 =A <pb=P9 + L
" -y + (1-7(1 - A) I" " - A
L .b
x9 = 0 < xb = ; Pb = Zo
p- Zo'
Such contracts are incentive compatible and break even in expectation, leave the strong
types indifferent relative to the no-IMF benchmark and leave the weak types strictly better (if
L > 0).
Proposition 9 when contracts are required to break even in expectation, any L > 0 allows
the IMF to make a Pareto improvement relative to the no-IMF equilibrium. In cases of lim-
ited outside liquidity provision (L < Lnn) some cross subsidization from good to bad types is
required.
When there is abundant liquidity (L > L'i"), the previous Proposition follows from the
results for contracts that break even type by type. When L is limited (L < L"'"), the fact that
contracts have to break even in expectation does not eliminate all cross subsidization. Actually,
some cross subsidization is strictly required.
1.4.3 CCLs in practice
Since 1999 three different contingent lending facilities have been introduced by the IMF: the
Contingent Credit Lines (CCL), the Short Term Liquidity facility (SLF) and the Flexible Credit
Lines (FCL). They all shared the same basic premise: increase eligibility requirements ex ante
in order to provide reduced conditionality ex post. The CCL was allowed to expire in 2003 and
the SLF introduced in October 2008 was replaced by the FCL in March 2009. Both the CCL
arid the SLF failed to attract a single borrower request.
The reluctance of the targeted emerging economies to join these facilities resulted in con-
secutive re-designs to provide more appealing terms. In November 2000 the CCL's conditions
for activation were simplified to enhance automaticity, also the rate of charge arid the commit-
merit fee were reduced. Under the SLF ex-post conditionality was further reduced. The FCL
increased the size of the committed resources to 10 times the quota (compared to 3-5 under the
CCL and SLF) and extended the repayment period to 3.5 to 5 years (compared to 3 months
under the SLF). Mexico (47bn), Poland (21bn) and Colombia (11bn) are currently enrolled in
the FCL.
This sequence of re-designs in the facility does not provide direct evidence in favour of the
signaling story in this paper. However, it is interesting to read the sequence of events through
the lens of the model. The contingent credit lines are associated with a signaling cost and with
a benefit resulting from reduced inefficient liquidation of the projects. Holding everything else
constant, re-designs improving the terms of IMF external insurance help overcome the signaling
costs.
So far we have used the parameter L to index the level of liquidity the IMF may provide in
case of a shock. As such, L is a measure of how good the IMF contingent lines are at providing
insurance. Of course, there are many dimensions other than the size that determine how good
an insurance contract is. Take, for example, a context where the bad type faces a variety of
liquidity shocks, some of which are contractible with the IMF and some of which are not. All
shocks are identical in the sense that they require a reinvestment p for continuation. Only a
fraction 4) of the shocks is insurable by the IMF, meaning that the IMF can commit to provide
funds up to I in those states of the world. Under our assumptions, weak countries optimally
choose continuation L in each of the insurable states, yielding utility
L
Unm~m (L, 4)) = (1 - A) z1 - I + A4) Z 1 - p)p - Zo
The symmetric information payoff for the bad type depends on 4) in the same way as it
depends on L. Even if I have presented the results in terms of the size of liquidity provision,
it should be understood more generally as how attractive the terms of IMF insurance are (e.g.
size, maturity, automaticity).
1.5 Endogenous effort choice
The possibility that liquidity provision by the IMF may induce debtor moral hazard has been
a concern for the design of the Contingent Credit Lines. Insurance across states of nature
makes bad states less unattractive and therefore may discourage governments' costly actions
that reduce the probability of adverse macroeconomic shocks. This is one of the concerns that
the inclusion of ex-ante eligibility criteria has been designed to address (at least partially). In
this section, I analyze the effect of liquidity provision by the IMF on crisis prevention effort
in the setting of my model. I show that optimal crisis prevention effort has a non-monotone
relationship with IMF liquidity provision.
The relationship between IMF interventions and debtor moral hazard has been theoretically
analyzed under different settings. Jeanne and Zettlemeyer (2004) consider a case in which
borrowers may pledge more income to the IMF than to the private lenders. They show that
IMF intervention may increase or decrease domestic efforts to avoid a crisis, although this is
not moral hazard in strict sense if the IMF lends at actuarially fair rates. Morris and Shin
(2006) study the catalytic finance role of the IMF. In their setting the IMF reduces an ex-
post inefficiency by solving creditor coordination failure. Adjustment effort (as a function of
underlying fundamentals) with and without IMF cannot be unambiguously ranked. Basu (2009)
explores a setting with moral hazard followed by adverse selection in which the IMF allows for
redistributive transfers ex post. He concludes that IMF intervention can ameliorate the moral
hazard problem ex ante.
I analyze the effect of liquidity provision by the IMF on crisis prevention effort by the bad
type. In particular, I restrict attention to the case in which the bad type receives the maximum
of the pooling equilibrium without the IMF and his symmetric information payoff given liquidity
L (as in the case in which contracts are required to break even type by type). I do not consider
the case in which contracts are redesigned to elicit effort.
Assume that the bad type may exert some effort e to reduce the probability of a liquidity
shock A (e) at a cost c (e). In particular, assume A (e) = A - e and c (e) = be-. I choose the
parameter b to obtain interior solutions. For e to belong to [0, a < A] I require b > Zi/A.
Given outside liquidity L, the bad type's utility level is given by
maxe (1 - A + e) Zi - + -A A - b ;
maxe (1 - A + e) Z + (A - e) (Zi - p) - I - bL
For low levels of outside liquidity L, the types will remain pooled. The optimal effort choice
e while types remain pooled is independent of L and solves the first order condition
Z1 - ,y-(I -A)= be[ + (1 - -) (1 - A + )
When L is large enough to attain separation of types, the optimal effort level e* (L) is given
by
1 L~
e* () - - (Z - p)b I p - zo
Effort provision is decreasing in L, ranging from e* (0) = Z 1 /b to e* (p - Zo) = p/b.
The minimum size of outside liquidity required for the IMF to attain separation of types is
denoted L when effort is chosen optimally and L"" (e) when effort is fixed at the pooling level
E. The following Proposition summarizes the results:
Proposition 10 e Small size interventions (L in [0, L)) will not be accepted by the weak
type and therefore do not affect effort choice relative to the no-IMF benchmark.
* Intermediate size interventions (L in [L, L" "i (e))) strictly increase effort choice by the
weak country relative to the no-IMF benchmark.
" Large size interventions (L in [L"" (2) , p-Zo]) may increase or decrease crisis prevention
effort relative to the no-IMF benchmark.
" In the range [L, p - Zo] , effort choice is decreasing in liquidity provision.
The size of the liquidity provision in case of a shock L matters in two respects: it determines
whether the IMF may induce separation of types or not, and conditional on separation it affects
the optimal choice of effort. While countries remain pooled the bad type does not receive the
entire marginal payoff for increasing his effort choice. As a result, in the no-IMF benchmark,
effort provision is lower than in the symmetric information setting.
Once liquidity is large enough to attain separation, the bad type receives the marginal return
on its effort choice. The effect of internalizing the full returns in the separation determines the
existence of a region in which crisis prevention effort increases relative to the no-IMF benchmark.
Conditional on separation, liquidity provision prevents inefficient liquidation in case of a shock,
making the shock scenario less unattractive and the optimal effort provision declines.
The possibility that liquidity provision by the IMF may reduce crisis prevention effort by
debtor countries has been a concern for the design of the Contingent Credit Lines. In the
setting of my model, the relationship between the two variables is non-monotone. Optimal crisis
prevention effort increases (relative to the no-IMF benchmark) for intermediate size liquidity
interventions. The reason behind the result is the existence of a minimum intervention scale for
the weak type to take on the IMF liquidity provision and therefore, internalize the full return
on an extra unit of effort.
1.6 Additional country types
An alternative signaling story is that the target economies of this IMF facility may take a
costly action (i.e. not taking the contingent credit line) to credibly signal their type." This
story is possibly complementary to the one in the basic framework considered so far, but it
is important to understand the differences between them. Consider a setting with 3 types of
countries: good, medium and bad. Take the target economy of the IMF to be the medium
"Although in a different setting, such story is in line with Marchesi and Thomas (1999). In their paper the
costly action that enables stronger countries to credibly signal their type is given by costly IMF conditionality.
type. The medium type may benefit from being taken for a strong type and is concerned about
being confused with a weak type. We could expect the target economies to take actions to
mimic stronger types and to differentiate themselves from worse types. These represent two
different kinds of signaling concerns. The discussion in the previous sections is centered around
the ("upward") concern that taking the CCL might reveal the country is not as good as the
market had previously expected (losing cross subsidies). In this section I reinterpret the setting
of the model to illustrate the ("downward") concern about being confused with a worse type.
Assume both types face liquidity shocks with positive probability (Ab > Ag > 0). I focus
on the best separating allocation for the strong(er) type. The bad types impose an externality
on the good types, and as it is standard in information theory, good types may take some
costly action as a means of separation. In the setting of the model, the costly action takes the
form of lower continuation in case of a crisis, or even no continuation at all. The reason is
that good types face liquidity shocks with lower probability and therefore a lower probability
of continuation is more costly to the bad types.
Proposition 11 Provided that 0 < L < L' - ]A Ab -A9 (p - Zo) , the best separating allo-Z1  -P \ (i -A-)
cation for the strong(er) type involves no continuation for the strong type in case of a shock
(x = 0). Weak(er) types continue with probability x9 z L-
Proposition 12 Provided that L' = (p - Zo) < I < (p - Zo) , the best sep-
arating allocation for the strong(er) type involves continuation with probability 0 < x =
(1-Ag)A6 b (zi -4)-(I-A)(A b -A)
(1-A9)A( b(Zo)-(i-A)by(p-ZO) < 1 for the strong type in case of a shock. Weak(er) types
continue with probability x 9 = pzo
The good types choose lower continuation than they would under symmetric information.
For low liquidity levels (L < L'), the result is extreme, they choose not to insure the shock at
all (x9 = 0). Even if the IMF could hoard enough liquidity to separate types15 , the good types
' Assuming that Ag [> (1 - A9) + (1 - ) (1 - Ab)] Z + (1 - y) (A' - A9) Zo < (1 - A9 ) [yAp + (1 - -Y) Ab] p
the following propositions follow:
Proposition 13 No pooling allocation provides a Pareto improvement relative to the No IMF benchmark.
Proposition 14 Provided that 0 < L < Lr'i" - " I_^ (p - Zo) the IMF cannot generate
a Pareto improvement relative to the No IMF benchmark (nor pooling nor separating).
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Figure 1-2: Best separating allocation for strong(er) type.
(that would benefit from insurance contracts under symmetric information), do not take the
contingent credit lines to signal their type (provided L < L'). That is, the fact that a country
is "under-insuring" by not taking the CCL does not necessarily imply that the facility is not
playing a role, as it was the case in the basic setting.
Note that in this reinterpretation of the model, I have shifted attention from weak types
not taking the contingent lines to strong types not taking the contingent lines. The reason is
that I am using reinterpretations of a 2 type model to understand a story that involves 3 types.
The target economy for the IMF is the medium type. When I focus on the "upward" concern
in a 2 type model, the target economy is the weaker country. When I focus on the "downward"
concern, it is the stronger one.
A "critical feature o.f the {IMF] CCL" that I have abstracted from so far is given by the
inclusion of eligibility criteria.16 Pre-qualification requirements were included for a number of
reasons. Firstly, to safeguard IMF resources when providing large sums with reduced condi-
tionality. Secondly, to reduce moral hazard by shifting from ex post to ex ante conditionality.
And finally, to provide signaling. The eligibility criteria could be used to ".. signal Fund's confi-
dence in member's economic policy". The objective was to "(set) threshold for eligibility at an
appropriately high level to avoid the risk of validating a policy framework that proved fragile."
Based on this last point, it could be argued that the inclusion of the eligibility criteria is, at
least in part, oriented towards ameliorating the "downward" concern.
Proposition 15 LI " (p -Z) < _ A (p! Zo).
S r 0 an P y h-A' e+igb--y)-X cn
'See Arregui 2008 for an analysis of the eligibility criteria in a context of 3 types,
1.7 Reserve accumulation
In reality, countries have access to a variety of insurance mechanisms other than IMF pack-
ages.17 In particular, during the last decade, emerging economies have increasingly self-insured
through the accumulation of international reserves. Even when optimally managed, this option
entails substantial costs (see Caballero and Panageas 05a,b) and this is the reason why external
insurance arrangements have been advocated as more efficient insurance mechanisms against
small probability events (such as large capital outflows). The IMF challenge has been to provide
the right facility for state contingent liquidity provision.ls
In this section I connect my model with the ongoing debate about excessive reserve hoarding.
Countries accumulate reserves for self insurance and for a variety of other reasons (e.g. by
product of export led growth). Their use for self insurance is likely to remain as long as the
state contingent alternatives are limited in the types of shock they may insure. Also, the fact
that countries accumulate reserves for reasons other than self insurance influences their use for
self insurance. The idea is that the signaling content (information revealing) of reserve hoarding
is lower than that of IMF insurance.
In the setting of the previous sections, given the absence of a storage technology, the inability
by the lenders to commit future resources implies that every macroeconomic shock inevitably
results in project liquidation. IMF provision of outside liquidity was assumed to be the only
source of insurance available to the countries. Consider now the introduction of reserves in the
symmetric information setting. Access to a storage technology that yields one unit at t = 1 for
each unit invested at t = 0 allows for full continuation in case of a shock. That is, the storage
technology gets around the lenders' commitment problem by allowing lenders to hand in at
t = 0 the resources needed at t = 1. If the storage technology is efficient, the IMF provides no
advantage relative to the no-IMF benchmark.
However, if the storage technology is inefficient (e.g. it yields 0 < 1 units at t = 1 for each
unit invested at t = 0) the introduction of the IMF still provides an efficiency gain relative to
the no-IMF benchmark. By (partially) solving the commitment problem of the lenders, the
IMF provides state contingent liquidity which is less costly than the use of the unconditional
"See Cordella and Levy Yeyati 2005 for an overview of available alternatives.
"See Holmstrom and Tirole 1998 for a discussion on the advantages of state contingent liquidity provision.
storage technology.
Consider the same setting as the one in the main section with the following variation, each
type i E {g, b} has access to a storage technology that delivers 0' units at t = 1 per unit
invested at t = 0. For simplicity, the returns on the short term investment are assumed to be
non pledgeable and initials funds are set to zero A = 0. The only source of pledgeable income
is still the fixed size project.
Assume that 0 b < 1, so that the storage technology for the weak country is inefficient.
Provided that reserves hoarding is not too inefficient (0 b > PZi -7), the bad type optimally
chooses to hoard reserves in order to allow for project continuation in case of a shock. The
utility level is given by
Usymmnon_ contingent = (1 - A) Z1 - I + [o - 1) + Ab ymm,non contingent
ab min(1 - )Z 
;p - Zo
aymm, non_ contingent =min{(1-A)Zo -;P b}
Non contingent reserves make a loss 0 b- 1 in every state, but they allow the project to survive
with positive probability when it is hit by a shock. The amount of reserves is determined by the
minimum between the amount required to achieve full continuation and what pledgeable income
allows to borrow (recall that the fixed size project is the only source of pledgeable income).
Suppose instead that the country may purchase at a (actuarially fair) price A a unit of good
delivered at t = 1 in case of a shock. In this case, the uncontingent storage technology will not
be used. The utility level is given by
UAymm,contingent = + A8- 1I sy mm,contingent
ab .i (I1 - A) Zo - I p - Zo
symm,contingent = mm { (b
Contingent liquidity provision incurs the loss 0 b - 1 only in case of a shock and allows for
continuation of the project in such a case. This is exactly the sense in which state contingent
provision of liquidity dominates uncontingent reserves. As before, the amount of reserves is
determined by the minimum between the amount required to achieve full continuation and
what pledgeable income allows the country to borrow. The efficiency gains generated by the
use of contingent liquidity relax the credit constraints, potentially providing an extra channel
to increase utility levels, i.e. aymmcontrngent ;> amnon contingent
When state contingent liquidity provision spans the entire liquidity shock space, it dominates
reserves hoarding as an insurance mechanism. Consider instead a setting with multiple liquidity
shocks some of which are contractible and some of which are not. An extra unit of reserves
loses ex post when there is no crisis and pays off in case of any shock. An extra unit of IMF
insurance does riot lose if there is no crisis, loses if there is an uninsurable shock and pays off
only if the shock that it insures happens. The narrower the circumstances under which the
CCL can be withdrawn limits the usefulness of the facility vis a vis reserves accumulation.
Such an environment with un-contractible shocks is natural given that liquidity crises are
very hard to define in an uncontroversial way ex ante and also ex post. For example, under
the original CCL facility, drawings were available only in response to contagion crises, i.e.
"difficulties [thatJ are judged to be largely beyond the members' control and to be primarily
from adverse developments in international capital markets". The purpose of this provision
was to safeguard IMF resources by limiting moral hazard. Several IMF members raised their
concern regarding the narrow use of the facility and the uncertainty generated by the ambiguous
definition of the states of nature in which IMF resources would be available.
Let us now compare reserves hoarding with state contingent liquidity provision in a setting
with asymmetric information. Given the assumption that only bad types face liquidity shocks
with positive probability, accumulation of reserves would in principle be subject to the same
signaling concerns that the IMF CCL have. To provide an explanation for the use of inefficient
self-insurance instead of IMF liquidity along the lines of the model in this paper, it is required
that the signaling content in hoarding reserves to be lower than the one in signing insurance
agreements with the IMF. The fact that countries accumulate reserves for many reasons other
than insurance (for example, reserve accumulation can be a by-product of export led growth)
provides a possible explanation for this.
A way to capture this idea in the model is to assume that the short term investment for
the good types is not inefficient i.e. 0 9 > 1. This assumption is only intended as a shortcut
to make reserves hoarding less revealing than state contingent insurance.19 Given that 09 > 1
"Alternatively, I have solved for the case in which economies are hit by exogenous random reserves require-
and (1 - A) Zo - I < PZo both good and bad types would like to invest as much as their
pledgeable income permits in the short term technology. The good types because their short
term technology is profitable, the bad types because (even if inefficient ) it allows for project
continuation in case of a shock. The benchmark in the absence of the IMF is given by a pooling
allocation in which the bad types receive cross subsidies from the good types20
pool =Zo
apool = {+(- (1- A)]ZO - I
The interesting case, in line with the model in the previous sections, is when the bad type
obtains higher utility by pooling than by revealing his type to obtain state contingent liquidity
provision,i.e. Ub > ymm,contingent IMF insurance provides efficiency gains relative to
reserve hoarding. However, if contracts are required to break even type by type, they would
not provide a Pareto improvement to the bad types relative to the no-IMF benchmark. As a
result, IMF insurance might not be implemented.
Contingent credit lines that are too small, too narrow or not cross subsidized enough become
less attractive relative to reserves hoarding, and might end up not being used if their signaling
content is higher than the one of reserves.
1.8 Conclusions
During the last decade, emerging economies have increasingly self-insured through the accumu-
lation of international reserves. Even when optimally managed, this option entails substantial
costs and for this reason, external insurance arrangements have been advocated as more efficient
insurance mechanisms against small probability events (such as large capital outflows). The
IMF challenge has been to provide the right facility for state contingent liquidity provision.
Since 1999 three different contingent lending facilities have been introduced by the IMF:
the Contingent Credit Lines (CCL), the Short Term Liquidity facility (SLF) and the Flexible
ments. However, this is not included in these notes.
2I assume [-y + (1 - y) (1 - A)] Zo - I < 9O and Q9 > O6 I + A .' L1 The pooling allocation dominates
the best separating allocation for the strong type.
Credit Lines (FCL). They all shared the same basic premise: increase eligibility requirements
ex ante in order to provide reduced conditionality ex post. The CCL was allowed to expire in
2003 and the SLF introduced in October 2008 was replaced by the FCL in March 2009. Both
the CCL and the SLF failed to attract a single borrower request.
A lesson from the CCL experience is that the informational content of these liquidity agree-
ments is vital. If the IMF is going to advocate a shift from ex-post to ex-ante conditionality it is
crucial that we understand the consequences in contexts of asymmetric information. This paper
provides a tractable simple model to understand the role of signaling concerns in discouraging
access to contingent credit lines. I show that in order to be implemented, contingent credit
lines are required to be either large in scale or to allow for cross subsidization across countries.
Also, optimal crisis prevention effort has a non-monotone relationship with IMF liquidity pro-
vision. For intermediate size liquidity provision, effort choice increases relative to the no-IMF
benchmark.
In the construction of the model many simplifications were made to isolate the role of signal-
ing concerns. In particular, there are two dimensions that I believe should be further explored
to enrich the conclusions of this paper. Firstly, it is important to understand the process of
creation of outside liquidity by the IMF. In terms of the model, what are the determinants of
L? What are the costs of liquidity provision and how can it be enhanced?
Secondly, I have modeled the liquidity shocks as an exogenous random process. A large
literature has explored the coordination origin of such shocks (e.g. Chang and Velasco 1998-99).
Moreover, even if not stated explicitly, part of the goal of IMF contingent credit lines is crisis
prevention. It would be interesting to understand how the relationship between expectation
coordination and signaling concerns works.
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1.9 Appendix
1.9.1 Symmetric information benchmark (proof of prop. 3)
The IMF offers contracts c = (P, Ps, x, L) that specify payments to the lender in case of
no shock and in case of a shock and completion, a probability of continuation x and liquidity
provision L in case of a shock. There is an exogenous supply of "outside" liquidity L. The
optimal contract for the country solves
max (1 - A) (Z1 - P,,) + Ax (Z1 - P,) - A s.t.
L,P.,Pus,,x
(1-A)Pns +Ax(P.-p) > I-A
Pns, Ps < ZO;0 < x 1
x(p -P) < L
L < L
Given condition 2 (Zo > I-A+Ap),
(L < L) the optimal allocation is given
(1- A)Pns
in the absence of the limited outside liquidity constraint
by x = 1 and (P,,, P,) such that
+Ax(P -p) - I- A
PS 5 Zo
Pns 5 ZO
If (p - Zo) < L the outside liquidity constraint is not binding (no problem with ignoring
Ub = Z1 - Ap
If (p - Zo) > L, then the outside liquidity constraint is binding. Then P,
x =
p - ZO
and P,, such that (1 A) Pns + A L (Zo - p) = I - A
Pns
I - A + AL
1 - A
(note that P,2, < Zo given condition 2. The utility level is given by
L
Ubz=(1 A) Zi + A (Z 1 - p)
p - Zo
which is increasing in L in [0, p Zo]
Consider the case in which (1 - A) Zo + A (Zo - p) < I - A (which violates condition 2). In
the absence of the limited outside liquidity constraint (L < L) the optimal allocation is given
by P, = P 1 , = Zo and
(1 - A) Zo - (I - A)
A (p - Zo)
If (1-A)zo (I-A) < L the outside liquidity constraint is not binding (no problem with
ignoring it).
If (1-A)Zo (I-A) > L the outside liquidity constraint is binding. Then P, = Zo,A
L
x =
p - Zo
and P,, such that (1 - A) Pns + AL (Zo - p) = I - A
I - A + AL
PnS = 1A
= Zo,
The utility level is given by
L
Ub =0( - A) Z1 + A (Z - P)-I
p - Zo
which is increasing in L in 0, (1 A)Zo- (I -A)
1.9.2 Asymmetric information - No IMF (proof of prop. 6)
More generally a contract could specify a probability of financing x, a payment to the lender in
case of financing and no shock Pa5 , a payment to the lender in case of financing and shock, and
an initial transfer from the borrower to the lender A (the borrower keeps A - A). Note A < 0
is allowed, it would be an initial transfer from the lender to the borrower. Note that contracts
may not specify continuation probabilities in the absence of the IMF.
Define
U x [(1 A) (z1 -
U1 =Xi [(1I Ai) P i, +
P ) + A' (-- Ps) Ai
A Pi - i] + Zi
Note
We want to find the best allocation for the
expectation, are incentive compatible and satisfy
strong type out of those that break even in
the limited pledgeability constraints. That is,
max x [ Zi - Pgs| - Ag s.t.
IC constraints for the good and for the bad type
9 [1  xb [Z1 - - b
Xg [(1 - A) (Z1 - Pnqs) + A (-Ps)] - A
U + uji = X' [(1 - A') Z, - I]
xg [ZI - Pn~s] - Ag
x b [(1 - A) (Z1 - P,' ) + A (-P,) ] -A
limited pledgeability constraints for i = g, b
PI < zo
P S < 0
< A
0 < x t <1
break even constraint in expectation constraint
Note first that setting P9' = 0 just relaxes the IC constraint for the weak type.
The incentive compatibility constraint for the weak type may be written as
ub > u - Ax9 (Z 1 - P9)
and the break even constraint as
A) Z1 - I] - u > 0
Ignore for now the IC constraint for the good type (will verify later). Note the IC constraint
for the bad type must bind ( = b Axg (Zi P 5 )). We may rewrite the program as
max u9 s.t.
xoxgppg b
y [xg [Z1 -I ]+(1 - _)xb [(1 - A) Z1 - I] + (1
-Y [xg [Pg, - I| + Ag + (1
- -) 1xb [(1 _ A) pns + APsb - I] +A b 2 0
)Axg (Z1 - Pg,) >ug
S[xg [Z1 - I) - U9] + (1 - -Y) Xz [(1
Ps < Zo
Ks A
A0 < A
0 < x9,X b <
SIA may be recovered using u: u, - Ax9 (Z1 - Pns)
Given that (1 - A) Z1 - I > 0, we set xb =1
For x9 = 0 the maximum level of utility that the good type may obtain solves
max -Ag s.t.
xb,XgP9 9
(1-y)[(1 - A)Z 1 - I];> -Ag
P, < Zo
Ag < A
0 < x <1
that is, we set (1 - y) [(1 - A) Z1
good type.
I] =-Ag which gives (1 - -y) [(1 A) Z 1 - I) to the
For x9 = 1 the maximum level of utility that the good type may obtain solves
Z1 - (P, + ,9) s.t.max_
xb 199,949 A
[- + (1 - - ) (1 - A)] Pns, + Ag > I
P, < ZO
Ag < A
0 < xg<1
so we set Ag = A and Pg, =(. This gives the good type utility Z1-Q+(1 (1-A) + A).
To compare the case zg = 0 with the case -g = 1, note that
(1 - A) Z1- I ;> ( (1  - A) Z1 - 1]
Zs A > Z1i - IA - A
-y + (1-y) (1 - A) - (1 - A)
so it suffices to show that Zi - - - A > (1 - A) Z1 -I, which follows from the assumption
(1 - A) Zi > I - A.
What if x, C (0, 1)? It can also be shown that the optimum is increasing in x,.
1.9.3 Asymmetric information - IMF
Decentralization
Let the contracts signed with the IMF specify a payment to the IMF in case of no shock P ,,
a payment to the IMF in case of a shock and completion Pi and a payment to the country
in case of a shock L', all conditional on the project getting funding in the capital markets.
Let c' = (P,,. P,, L') denote the contract for type i. The IMF offers a contract menu (cg, cb).
Country i chooses contract c' (due to the Revelation principle I restrict attention to incentive
compatible contracts). The choice by the country is observed by capital markets that provide
financing for the project I - A. The contracts with capital markets specify a payment in case
no shock pns that break even given beliefs held by capital markets. The choice of contract
affects beliefs about types and therefore the value of the required payment. If c' # c' type
is revealed (update in beliefs) and pn = If c' = c' type is not revealed (no update in
beliefs) and pn - A
Timing:
. IMF offers a menu (c9, cb)
* Country i chooses c'.
* If c9 / cb type is revealed (update in beliefs).
If c9  cb type is not revealed (no update in beliefs).
Contract with capital markets specifies I - A in exchange for p in case of success.
( I-A I-A j A
Consider separating contracts c9 ) cb. The set of restrictions for the IMF is given by: the
break even constraint for the lenders
(1 - A') p's = I - A
the break even constraint for the IMF (type by type)
(1 - Ai) Pi + AYzx (Ps) > AL
the limited pledgeability constraints
pn, + Pn < zo
P < Zo
the continuation constraints2 1
x9 [p - (Zo - P,)] < L
the limited aggregate liquidity
L' < L
And the incentive compatibility constraints given by utility levels for type i
U = (1 - A') [Z 1 - Pi, ps] + A'x [Zi - Zo] - A
2 Assuming that the IMF may not be dilluted.
Incentive compatibility
[Z1 - Pn, - pg,] - A
(1 - A) Zi - P p + Ax6 [Z1 Zo] - A > (1 - A) [Z1
Putting together the break even constraint for the lenders and for the IMF,
(1 - A') (Pn,8 + p',) + A'x'Ps, > AL' + I - A
and using the fact that the continuation constraint will bind, we obtain
(1 - A') (Pn's + p',) + AYx (Zo - p) > I - A
Analogously, if IMF contracts are required to break even in expectation (using the fact that
L9 = 0 and the continuation constraint will bind for the weak country), we obtain
-Y (P, + pn,,) + (1
Therefore, the restrictions consider in the text correspond to the decentralized problem.
1.9.4 In expectation (proof of prop. 9)
Consider the set of restrictions for the IMF:
1. IC for good
ns S - Pn
2. IC for bad (setting xg = 0)
- A) (Z1 - Pt')
3. Break even constraint
p) > I - A
> [Z1 PS - p
Zo] - APRg, - pl,]|+ Axg [Z1
[) (1 - A) (Pna, + p'n,) + AXb (Zo, - p)] > I- A
(1 - A) n,-P~) + AXb (Z1 - Pb) > (1I
(1 - y) (1 - A) Pb, + -yPg, + (1 - -y) Axb (Pf
4. Limited pledgeability constraint (i = g, b)
Pns, P'Zo
5. Pareto improvement for the good type
I-A
ns 7+(1 - ) (1l A)
6. Pareto improvement for the bad type
1-A) (Zi - P, + A p1 -- P+ (
7. continuation restriction
xb( psb < L
Starting at the no IMF pooling equilibrium, all restrictions are satisfied. Consider the
following deviation from the no IMF pooling equilibrium: for small E > 0
jj~b -O
xb __E3: - p-Zo
I A
-y + ( -- y)(1- A)
ns 7+ (1 -y)(1- A) +E
Note: provided E1 and E2 are positive, IC for good, limited pledgeability for good and Pareto
improvement for good are satisfied. Continuation constraint is satisfied as long as e is small
and limited pledgeability for bad is satisfied provided 62 is small.
It remains to show that, for given small E we may find positive E1 and E2 that satisfy IC for
weak and break even constraint.
Subinto the expressions to obtain
A (Zi - Zo)
p - Zo
> (1 A) (EI + E2)
(1--y) AE > (1--7)(1- A)E2 -731l
We may find Ei and 62 that solve the previous equations with equality as functions of E and
show they positive and increasing in E.
= (1 y 1 -
(1 -o + -Y__ __ zo
E2 E A 1-A p Zo(1 - Y) (1 - A) + -Y
A
Ap - z(Z 1
(1 - Y) + __ Z -ZoA 6 -Zo)-A 1-A p-Zo
1-Ap - Z( (1 - A)(+1y
A Z1 - Zo
1 - A p - Zo A-A 
-y)
(1 - 7) (1 - A) +
A 1 Zi - Zo
1 - A (1 - -y) (1 - A) +7 p - Zo
I Z1 - pp - Zo
(1 -Y ) AEA) +
Therefore, as long as L > 0 we may always find a deviation from the no IMF pooling
equilibrium that provides some continuation in case of a shock for the bad type and that results
in a strict Pareto improvement.
A Z
1-- A Z(Z1 Zo) E2
(1 - )AE Zo) + Y2
- 61
1.9.5 Effort choice (proof of prop. 10)
Call U (L, e) =(1- A+ e) Z1 + (A -e) (Z1 - p) - I - bL and U (L) =U (I e* (I)) .
Note
U(0) (l-A)Zi- 2
2
U(p- Zo) = (1-A)Z1+A(Z1-p)-I + 2b
U' (L) = [A -e*(L)]Z -p>0
U" (L) > 0
Consider 2 cases:
Case 1: Z1 - )]2 (I - A) < p. Implies e* (0) > e* (p - Zo) > E.
Case12)(1A+1 )Case 2: Zi - 2(I - A) > p. Implies e* (0) > e > e* (p - Zo).
How does U (L 0) compare to UPO"'? Compare first to UP"' (e* (0))
U (L= 0)= - Uo) (e* (0)) = (A - e* (0)) [ (I A) < 0
1-+ (1 - 7)(1-- A+ e* (0))
Using the fact that UPOOI > UP' (e* (0)), then UP"' > U (I = 0) . That is, when there is
very little liquidity, the bad type will rather stay pooled.
How does UPOO compare to U (L = p - Zo)? Compare first to U (L = p - Zo, 2)
7(I- A)
U (L = p - Zo, E) - UP = (A - ) (Z - p) - ( - A)(1 -A >0
Since we have assumed Z 1 -p > I-A . Using the fact that U (L1 = p - Zo) > U (L = p - Zo, e)
then U (I = p - Zo) > UPOOI. That is, when there is sufficient liquidity, the bad type will take
the liquidity offer.
Also, given that U (L) is increasing in L we know there is a L that makes the bad type
indifferent between pooling or separating: UPO = U (W .
Under case 1, the effort level increases relative to the effort level when pooled e for all
liquidity provision L in (L, p - Zo]. In particular, at L the effort choice has a discontinuity
(jumps upwards).
What about under case 2? We know that for sufficient liquidity provision, the optimal effort
choice will eventually be lower than the effort choice when pooled. However, I show that at L
the effort choice jumps upwards.
Given that L satisfies UP"' = U () and using the fact that U (L > U (Lt 2) we obtain
L min 'Y I AL"(e)= (p - Zo) > La7 +(1 -7(1 - A +e ) Zi - p
To show that effort choice must jump upwards at L, it suffices to show that it does not
decrease at Li" (8) (since e* (I) is decreasing in L and L'"i (e) > L. That is, I need to show
that e* (Lmin (B)) > e.
Note
1 L" (8) 1(L") - Z1 - (Z 1 - p)b p - zo
= Zi - (I-A)
b - + (1 - ) (1 - A + 5)
So we must verify that
Z1 I - A) > be
7+ (1-3 1-A + e
which must hold, since we know from FOC that defines s
I A
, + (1 - -y) (1 - A + e)7+ (1 -7) (1 - A + s)
Chapter 2
Eligibility Criteria and IMF
Contingent Credit Lines
Abstract
The inclusion of eligibility criteria was a critical feature of the IMF Contingent
Credit Lines (CCL) to signal the Fund's confidence in a member's economic policy.
Emerging economies with "strong fundamentals " were the target of the facility. The
confidence at the IMF on the beneficial effects that a stamp of approval could have
on financial markets, contrasted with the decision of countries not to join the CCL.
This paper studies the role of eligibility requirements that make the CCL close to
a rating agency. Risk averse countries seek insurance in international capital markets
against aggregate income shocks. Countries differ in the probability of being hit by
a shock, which is private information. I focus on a No-IMF benchmark in which
the target economies for the facility manage to separate from weaker countries by
underinsuring. I model IMF CCL as the introduction of an imperfect stress test
that countries may voluntarily take.
The quality of the stress test plays a crucial role to determine the type of equi-
libria that may arise. If the stress test is good enough, it allows for an equilibrium
wherein target economies take the exam and weaker types do not. The IMF gen-
erates a Pareto improvement by providing target economies with a cheaper way to
separate from weaker economies. However, if the quality of the stress test is low
enough, there exists an equilibrium in which no country chooses to take the exam.
Provided that the cost of the exam is low enough, I show that forcing all countries
to take the exam (e.g. by publishing a list of eligible countries) Pareto dominates
the equilibrium in which no country takes the exam.
2.1 Introduction
Emerging economies are exposed to significant macroeconomic risk. The IMF established the
Contingent Credit Lines (CCL) in 1999 to "help countries with strong policies avoid contagion
crises." The program was instituted to provide an efficient international insurance mechanism
to guard against aggregate uncertainty. However, the CCL expired in 2003, never having been
utilized. Its successor, the Short Term Liquidity Facility (SLF) introduced in October 2008,
suffered the same fate. It was not until the introduction of the Flexible Credit Lines (FCL) in
2009 that the IMF managed to attract countries to join the program.
During the very same period, emerging economies increasingly self-insured through the
accumulation of international reserves. Cordella and Levy Yeyati (2005) report that reserve
hoarding, as a fraction of GDP, increased from 8.9% in 1992 to 18.1% in 2002 in their sample
of 35 emerging economies. Even when optimally managed, this option entails substantial costs
(see Caballero and Panageas 2005a,b) and for this reason, external insurance arrangements have
been advocated as more efficient insurance mechanisms against small probability events (such
as large capital outflows).
The IMF CCL had two distinctive features compared to other IMF lending facilities. The
first distinctive feature was to increase eligibility requirements ex-ante. The CCL were not
available for all IMF members. Each country had to request to join the program and the IMF
Board would assess eligibility. Emerging economies with "strong fundamentals " were the target
of the facility. The criteria to assess eligibility were broadly defined, allowing for some discretion
in the evaluation process. The second distinctive feature was to reduce conditionality ex-post
(for qualified countries), so that periods of exceptional financial pressure in the capital account
could be met with higher "automaticity" (i.e. large amounts readily available) of funds.
IMF members that were the target of this facility expressed several concerns regarding the
potential gains of ex-post reduced conditionality. 1 They suspected that the committed resources
(3 to 5 times the country's quota) were not large enough to provide adequate protection in
the case of a sudden stop. Also, the "automaticity" of funds was not guaranteed; activation
reviews and IMF board approval were required. At the same time, other IMF arrangements were
'The SLF and FCL introduced modifications to make the ex-post reduced conditionality more attractive (see
Arregui 2009).
improved to speed up the provision of similar amount of resources under similar conditions (but
without the requirement of ex-ante eligibility). Throughout this paper I ignore the reduction
in ex-post conditionality and focus on the role of eligibility requirements. 2
The inclusion of eligibility criteria was a "critical feature of the CCL"3 for several reasons.
First, it eased concerns that IMF resources would be endangered. From a historical perspective
this was the first IMF facility to provide access to large sums without conditionality. Second,
the shift from ex-post to ex-ante conditionality was expected to reduce debtor moral hazard by
fostering crisis prevention effort rather than crisis resolution effort (see Ostry and Zettelmeyer
2005; Jeanne, Ostry and Zettelmeyer 2008). Finally, restricted eligibility could be used to
"signal the Fund's confidence in the member's economic policy". The goal was to set the
threshold for eligibility at an appropriately high level to avoid the risk of validating a fragile or
unsustainable policy framework.
The confidence at the IMF on the beneficial effects that a stamp of approval could have
on financial markets, contrasted with the decision of countries not to join the CCL. Not a
single IMF member requested to join the initial version of the facility. Quoting IMF reports:
"Potentially eligible countries were not confident that a CCL would be viewed as a sign of
strength rather than weakness".4
Eligibility requirements are present in other liquidity facilities other than the IMF CCL. At
the national level, the Federal Reserve identified a "stigma" associated with borrowing at the
Discount Window. Depository institutions expressed their concern that banking supervisors
and others might see borrowing as a sign of financial weakness. "Such stigma deterred some
institutions from using adjustment credit when doing so would have been appropriate." In 2003,
the Discount Window was modified along several dimensions. A crucial modification was the
inclusion of eligibility requirements.3 Both the Discount Window and IMF CCL include eligi-
2 Arregui 2009 complements this paper by abstracting from the role of eligibility requirements and focusing
on the gains of reduced ex-post conditionality.
"IMF, "Review of Contingent Credit Lines", SM/03/64, February 11, 2003, p. 11.
4 IMF, "Review of Contingent Credit Lines", SM/03/64, February 11, 2003, p. 2.
'To qualify for primary credit a depository institution must be in generally sound financial condition as
determined by its Reserve Bank. A Reserve Bank reviews an institution's condition on an ongoing basis using
supervisory ratings and capitalization data. An institution assigned a composite CAMELS rating of 1, 2, or 3
that is at least adequately capitalized is eligible for primary credit unless supplementary information indicates
that the institution is not generally sound.
bility criteria for the same goal: signaling. Quoting a Fed report: "the proposed changes should
appreciably reduce depository institutions' concern that borrowing will be perceived as a sign of
weakness, as only financially sound institutions will have access to primary credit". However,
the specific procedures differ.' I focus on the procedures of the IMF CCL.
In this paper, I study the role of eligibility requirements that make the CCL close to a
rating agency. Risk averse countries seek insurance in international capital markets against
(aggregate) income shocks. Countries differ in the probability of being hit by a shock, and
this probability is private information. I model the IMF CCL as an imperfect stress test which
countries may take voluntarily.
A number of papers study the IMF's role when there is unobservable heterogeneity in
countries' characteristics. Marchesi and Thomas (1999) analyze IMF conditionality as a costly
action that enables strong countries to credibly signal their type. Basu (2009) and Arregui
(2009) both argue that contracts signed with the IMF may reveal information to private capital
markets, which should be incorporated into the mechanism design problem of the IMF. In Basu's
paper, there is no ex ante heterogeneity and the IMF advantage is to commit to redistributive
transfers across types ex post. In Arregui (2009), the IMF is able to commit resources that the
private sector cannot, there is heterogeneity at the contracting stage and the IMF may not be
able to cross subsidize types. In this paper, the IMF has an advantage relative to the market
in extracting countries' private information.
Economic analysts disagree on the value of IMF economic monitoring and analysis. Some
view the IMF as a "... a technical institution which is better suited to monitor the global
situation on a daily basis (...)."7 Others remain more skeptical because " the IMF has a patchy
record with respect to being able to evaluate risks ex ante."" I parametrize the IMF's
advantage over private capital markets to encompass both views.
First, I consider a setting with only two types of countries: target economies of the CCL
facility (called medium types) and countries with a higher probability of adverse shocks (weak
"At the national level, banks are supervised periodically and the list of banks eligible to borrow at the
Discount Window remains confidential. Also, the loans are usually very short term (typically overnight) and
(over) collateralized.7 Calvo, Guillermo, "The G20 communique: Work in progress but good news for emerging markets", April 6
2009.
"Rodrik, Dani, "What would it take to make international finance safe?", April 07, 2009.
types). Without the IMF, medium types underinsure relative to the symmetric information
benchmark to credibly signal the market their type. That is, the presence of weak types
imposes a negative externality on medium types. Given the game's setting and assumptions,
this is the unique equilibrium in capital markets. I refer to it as the No-IMF benchmark. The
results obtained in this paper crucially depend on having both types separating in the No-IMF
benchmark.
Once the stress test is introduced, countries must chose before going to the market whether
to take the stress test or not. I consider a very stylized, simple sort of examination: with certain
probability the test reveals the country's true type and it remains uninformative otherwise. We
may think of this as the IMF being able to find enough evidence to certify to international
capital markets the country's true type or not. I ignore the possibility of mistakes in IMF
evaluations. The country taking an exam must face the costs it involves.
Stress test quality plays a vital role in determining the type of equilibria that may arise. As
long as the quality of the stress test is good enough, the introduction of the exam allows for an
equilibrium wherein target economies take the exam and weak types do not. Even if the exam is
not perfectly revealing, in this equilibrium informational rents are eliminated and each country
type obtains its symmetric information payoff. The IMF generates a Pareto improvement
relative to the No-IMF benchmark by providing a cheaper way for target economies to separate
from weak economies. This provides a rationale in favour of the introduction of country-
requested CCL for those who optimistically view the IMF.
However, if stress test quality is low, there exists an equilibrium wherein no country chooses
to take the exam. If a medium type takes the exam, there is only a small probability it can
certify its true type. Otherwise, the exam remains uninformative, the medium type faces the
cost of the exam and may still have to incur the costs of underinsurance to credibly signal its
type.
If the cost of the exam is low enough, I show that forcing all countries to take the exam!
Pareto dominates the equilibrium in which no country takes the exam. This provides a rationale
for the observation by Cordella and Levy-Yeyati (2005) that: "It is important to notice that the
country entry (signaling) problem depends on the country's need to make the first move to access
'And subsidizing the cost of the exam for those countries whose test is uninformative or reveals them weak.
the facility. These problems would be eliminated if eligibility criteria were made automatic.
In fact, the IMF considered re-designing the facility in that direction: "The potential changes
to the CCL include f...] (ii) a more systematic process for periodic assessments of eligibility,
independent of a request by the member, with the possibility of a published list of prequalified
members;.. ".1"
In the model, the exam cost plays a crucial role in deterring countries from requesting
the stress test. If we interpret exam cost as the cost of monitoring and evaluation, the costs
do not appear significant. However, I propose an alternative interpretation of the cost of
requesting a CCL. A typical concern shared by most of the emerging economies that were the
target of this facility has been to achieve recognition as stable and reliable economies. For
these economies in their "road to graduation", the decision to come to the IMF is largely
determined by the image they want to portray to foreign investors. Quoting an IMF report:
"Such a request, even from a member with quite strong perceived fundamentals, could convey a
signal o~f greater underlying vulnerabilities than the market had previously perceived (asymmetric
information)."1 The "image" or "reputation" costs can be large in magnitude.
I modify the original setting to introduce a third type of country: a strong type without
income shocks that does not request a CCL. There are dimensions along which weak and
medium countries could benefit from being perceived as a strong type (e.g. countries with
access to uncertain investment projects that are cheaper for stronger countries). The medium
economy, which is the target of this IMF facility, has two fundamental signaling concerns: (1)
an "upward" concern that an exam request reveals it is not the strong type; (2) a "downward"
concern that after taking the imperfect test, it might still be mistaken for the weaker type.
Both concerns explain the decision of target economies to refuse the eligibility test.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2 I introduce the model, review the sym-
metric information benchmark and analyze the No-IMF asymmetric information case. Section 3
introduces the IMF in the asymmetric information context and evaluates the procedure which
makes examinations compulsory. Section 4 extends the setting to introduce a third country
type that the target economies of the CCL try to imitate. Section 5 concludes. All proofs are
"'IMF, "Review of Contingent Credit Lines", SM/03/64, February 11, 2003, p. 2.
" IMF, "Review of Contingent Credit Lines", SM/03/64, February 11, 2003, p. 8.
included in the appendix.
2.2 The Model
I borrow the model's basic environment from Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976. The model consists
of 2 agents: a risk averse country with utility function u (x) increasing and strictly concave,
and risk neutral international lenders. There are 2 periods: t = 0, the contracting stage, and
t = 1. In period t = 1 the income for the country is y if there is no shock and y - d if there is a
shock. p represents the probability of an adverse shock. There is no discounting in the model.
At t = 0, the agents play a two stage game. First, the country proposes a contract a =
(ai, a 2), where ai represents a payment to the lender in the case of no shock, and a 2 is a
payment from the lender in the case of a shock. The contract gives expected utility u (a1, a2 ) =
pu (y - d + a 2 ) + (1 - p) u (y - a 1 ). The lender observes the proposal and chooses whether to
accept or not.
The symmetric information equilibrium is achieved by contract proposal a* and acceptance
rule a* (a) when two conditions are satisfied: (1) for any contract a, the lender accepts the
proposal if and only if it at least breaks even; (2) given a* (a), the country chooses a optimally.
As the country is risk averse and the lender is risk neutral, in equilibrium, the country is fully
insured and consumption is decreasing in the probability of an adverse shock (consumption is
y - pd in both states of nature). The lender just breaks even.
In the following subsection, I introduce asymmetric information in the setting (two types
-weak and medium- have private information about their probability of being hit by a shock)
and characterize the market outcome in the absence of the IMF. I set the game and make
assumptions in order to obtain the best separating allocation for the medium type as the
unique equilibrium. Weak types impose an externality on medium types, who underinsure in
order to credibly signal their type. I refer to this allocation as the No-IMF benchmark. All
results of the introduction of the IMF CCL are measured with respect to this particular No-IMF
benchmark.
2.2.1 Unobservable borrower heterogeneity
Consider the case of unobservable borrower heterogeneity. There are two types 0 of countries
{ w-eak, m-edium}.1 2 Countries differ in the probability of a shock, where pW > pm . These
probabilities are private information for the country. Let A be the probability of being a m-
edium type.
The contracting period t = 0 has three stages. First, each country type 0 proposes an option
contract c (0) = (a, d) where both a and & specify payments for each state of the world (shock,
no shock). The lender observes the proposal, updates his beliefs, and accepts if, and only if, the
updated expected profit is not negative. Finally, if the lender accepts the proposal, the country
must choose either a or &. The equilibrium is defined as a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in the
three stage game.
Maskin and Tirole (1992) proposed this three stage game structure. It departs both from
the competitive screening equilibrium definition in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and the two
stage game in which each type's contract proposal is accepted or rejected. This game structure
avoids dealing with non existent equilibria and limits the number of equilibria when coupled
with an assumption regarding the fraction of weak types in the economy.
A crucial allocation in the Maskin and Tirole framework is the low information intensity
optimum (liio). The low information intensity optimum (liio) is given by the allocation in
which weak types get their symmetric information payoff u mm= u (y - pwd) and medium
types attain their maximum utility level subject to a breakeven constraint for lenders and an
incentive compatibility constraint, which guarantees that weak types do not rather pretend to
be medium types. The medium type's payoff is denoted ua and solves:
u7ii = max pm u (y - d + a 2) + (1 - p m ) u (y - a1 ) s.t.Lk 1 ,(Oz2
0 < pa2 + (1 - pm) Cl
usymm > pwu (y - d + a2) + (1p) (y - a)
12 call country types "weak" and "medium" because a "strong" type is introduced in Section 4.
Figure 2-1: Low information intensity optimum (liio)
At any arbitrary (01, o2 ) the slope of the indifference curve for each type is given by
1-p2 u'(y-cv) which is decreasing in p'. Given the medium types' lower probability of facing
IT '(-Y-d+0c2)
adverse shocks, they are less eager to obtain insurance. Both constraints must bind. Therefore,
the solution is given by the intersection of the two constraints. The medium types underinsure
relative to the symmetric information benchmark to separate themselves from weak types. That
is, the presence of the weak types imposes a negative externality on the medium types.
The liio is depicted in figure 1. The upward sloping straight lines represent the breakeven
constraint for the lender when faced with a medium or weak type. The slope of the indifference
curve is higher for medium types than for weak types. The downward sloping straight line
represents the contracts which provide full insurance. At the liio, both contracts just break
even; the weak type is fully insured but the medium type is not. Its consumption in case of
no-shock is higher than in case of a shock.
Direct application of propositions 4, 5 and, theorem 1 in Maskin and Tirole (1992) yield
useful results summarized in the following Proposition:
Proposition 16 (Maskin and Tirole 1992) In the three stage game:
e each country type can always guarantee its liio payoff,
* the set of equilibrium payoffs for the two types of borrowers is the set of payoffs that
result from incentive compatible allocations, which are profitable in expectation and weakly
Pareto dominate the liio,
e there exists a threshold A E (0,1) such that the liio is the unique (perfect Bayesian)
equilibrium of the game i and only if A < .
By offering the option contract (a , iYmm) , the borrower guarantees his liio payoff in
equilibrium. The contracts in the menu are incentive compatible and break even, type by type,
so the lender knows he will break even irrespective of his beliefs about the borrower's type. The
liio is the unique equilibrium provided that the fraction of weak types is large enough. Note
that the liio coincides with the competitive screening equilibrium proposed by Rothschild and
Stiglitz (1976) whenever the latter exists.
Condition 17 Assume that 0 < A < A. Given this assumption, the liio constitutes the unique
equilibrium of the three stage game.
Given the setting of the three stage game and the assumption concerning the fraction
of weak types, the low information intensity optimum is the unique equilibrium in capital
markets. Natural candidates for the IMF contingent credit lines would like to insure against
liquidity shocks, but the presence of weaker countries pushes for under-insurance as a means of
separation. 13 I refer to this allocation as the No-IMF benchmark. All results of the introduction
of the IMF CCL are measured with respect to this particular No-IMF benchmark. In the next
section, I introduce the IMF in the setting. In terms of the model, I introduce a stress test
which reveals a country's type with certain probability and remains silent otherwise.
2.3 IMF as a stress test
In the basic setting, risk-averse countries insure against macroeconomic shocks through inter-
national capital markets. Now, I introduce the IMF in the framework, focusing on the role of
CCL eligibility criteria which make the IMF close to a rating agency. In terms of the model,
"The fact that weaker countries access full insurance (less volatile consumption) is counterfactual. Given that
the focus of this paper is on the target economies of the CCL, what is important is that those economies under-
insure to separate. In Arregui 2008 I present a setting in which by underinsuring the medium types manage to
exclude the uncreditworthy weak types from the market.
Prior: lambda Update prior: beta
Exam/Not Exam Exam . Revelation Capital Mkt
- Not Revelation
Figure 2-2: Timeline
I introduce a stress test that countries may voluntarily take. At t = -1 there is an imperfect
examination technology available. I consider a very stylized, simple examination: with proba-
bility y the exam reveals the country's true type, it remains uninformative otherwise. I ignore
the possibility of the IMF evaluation mistakes. Taking the test entails a cost c, paid in both
states of the world. I interpret "taking the exam" to mean applying for a credit line (eligibility
criteria).
The timeline presented in the previous section is extended as shown in figure 2. The timing is
as follows: (1) the country chooses whether to take the exam or not b (0) E {Exam, NotExam}:
(2) if the country takes the exam, the result is observed (revelation or not); (3) the lender up-
dates his priors after observing whether the exam is taken and its result when taken. Restrictions
on the belief-updating process apply. If the exam is revealing, the types are observed. In this
case:
0 (m/Exam,Revelation) = 1 if 0 = m
# (m/Exam,Revelation) = 0 if 0 = w
If countries refuse the exam 0 (m/NotExam) , or the exam reveals nothing 0 (m/Exam, Not Re uclation),
beliefs consistent with Bayesian updating are required on the equilibrium path and are free off
the equilibrium path. Finally, the country goes to the credit market to play the game described
in the previous section with updated priors and a modified income y - c for the countries
that took the exam.
I assume the test is not too costly, meaning that if the medium types could effectively use
the test to reveal their type they would be willing to incur such a cost.
Condition 18 Assume c > 0 satisfies fmm m = u (y - c - pm d) > um.
The quality of the stress test (indexed by -y) plays a crucial role in determining the type
of equilibria that may arise. If the stress test quality is good enough, the introduction of the
exam allows for an equilibrium in which target economies take the exam and weak types do not.
Even if the exam is not perfectly revealing (-y < 1), in this equilibrium informational rents are
eliminated and each country type obtains its symmetric information payoff. In welfare terms,
the IMF generates a Pareto improvement relative to the No-IMF benchmark by providing target
economies with a cheaper way to separate from weak economies. Weak types are indifferent
and medium types are strictly better.
In equilibrium, weak types receive their symmetric information payoff u (y - p'd). If they
imitate medium types by taking the exam, with probability -y their type is revealed and they
incur the cost of the test c in vain. Given that the stress test is not perfect, with probability
1 - y the test is not revealing and weak countries benefit from being taken for medium types.
A lower bound on -y is required for this deviation not to be profitable for the weak types.
Proposition 19 if '' < y < 1, there is a pure strategy separating equilibrium in which medium
types take the exam and weak types do not. Where
u (y - c - pmd) - u (y - pd)
u(y -c-pmd)-u(y -c-pd)<
This equilibrium captures how the IMF CCL was intended to work and provides a rationale
in favour of country-requested CCL. It requires the IMF being able to execute stress tests that
are sufficiently better relative to capital markets. This is an optimistic view wherein the IMF is
S..a technical institution which is better suited to monitor the global situation on a daily basis
...)"" However, not all economic analysts agree on the value of IMF economic monitoring
and analysis. Many analysts remain skeptical because "the IMF has a patchy record with
respect to being able to evaluate risks ex ante"1' As a matter of fact, no single country
requested to join the original version of the facility.
''Calvo, Guillermo, "The G20 communique: Work in progress but good news for emerging markets", April 6
2009.
"Rodrik, Dani, "What would it take to make international finance safe?", April 07, 2009.
If the stress test quality is low enough, there exists an equilibrium in which no country
chooses to take the exam. When none of the types takes the exam, beliefs cannot be updated.
Given that # (m/NotExam) = A < i, each type gets its liio payoff at the unique equilibrium. If
a type deviates, with probability -y, its true type is revealed, yielding u (y - c - p'd) for i = w, m.
However, if the exam is not revealing, beliefs are unspecified. Using the results from Maskin and
Tirole, each type can always guarantee its liio payoff. In this case, the liio payoffs are computed
given income y y- c. I denote those as u',rnm (-c) and u' 0 (-c) respectively. The liio payoffs
are the unique payoffs each type may obtain provided that 0 (r/Exam, NotRevelation) < .I
In equilibrium, medium types get their liio payoff u'. If they deviate by taking the exam,
with probability y their type is revealed. Given that the stress test is not perfect, with proba-
bility 1 -y their type is not revealed and they must still incur the costs of separating themselves
from the weak types. That is, they would have incurred the cost of the test c in vain. An upper
bound on -y is required for this deviation not to be profitable for the medium types.
Proposition 20 if 0 < -y < -yu, there is a pooling equilibrium in which no type takes the exam.
Where
UM - uM (-c)
u (y - c - pmd) - u c)
This equilibrium shows how expectations play a vital role and countries may be deterred
from joining the facility. The actual experience of the IMF CCL seems consistent with the IMF
not being able to do a much better job than capital markets in telling apart weak from medium
economies.
In terms of welfare, when the IMF CCL go unused each type receives the same payoff as
in the No-IMF benchmark. It should be noted that, depending on parameters, we may have
'U < y1 or y, < .y". The latter case is obtained when the exam cost is high: c is close to c,
where e satisfies u (y - E - pm d) - um,. If -y (< 7') is higher than -y", the separating and pooling
equilibria coexist, with the separating weakly Pareto dominating the pooling equilibrium.
" If ~ < 0 (m/Exam, NotRevelation) < 1, there are multiple equilibria in the three stage game after deviation.
If we ad hoc select the liio payoffs, then it coincides with the case in which .3 (m/Exam, NotRevelation) < A.
Choosing any other payoff will make it harder to sustain the pooling equilibrium. The reason is that any other
payoff will be higher than the liio and therefore the incentives to deviate are higher.
2.3.1 IMF taking the first step
In the previous subsection, I analyzed the procedure that requires each country to voluntarily
request an evaluation before going to capital markets. This procedure raised concern from
several economic analysts. For instance, Cordella and Levy-Yeyati 2005 suggested that "It is
important to notice that the country entry (signaling) problem depends on the country's need
to make the first move to access the facility. These problems would be eliminated if eligibil-
ity criteria were made automatic." Also, the IMF evaluated the possibility of modifying the
procedure in a review of the CCL facility in 2003. Quoting the IMF review report: "The po-
tential changes to the CCL include [...] (ii) a more systematic process for periodic assessments
of eligibility, independent of a request by the member, with the possibility of a published list of
prequalified members;.. ".1 In this subsection, I show that a compulsory test may yield a Pareto
improvement if properly implemented, provided that the cost of examination is not too large.
Consider the case in which the IMF imposes compulsory exams for all countries. We may
think of this as applying the eligibility criteria to all IMF members and publishing a list of
qualifying countries. I assume that the cost of examinations is born only by countries identified
as medium types.
A fraction (1 - A) y is identified as weak and therefore receive their symmetric information
benchmark u m = u (y - pwd). The exam does not reveal type for a fraction (1 - y) of
countries. Those economies face capital markets with priors (A, 1 - A) and income y. Because
A < A, the unique equilibrium is given by the liio. Unidentified medium and weak types get
u' 0 and u"mm respectively. A fraction Ay of countries is identified as medium types. Their
type is revealed to capital markets and their income decreases because they bare the cost of
examinations. The identified medium types' new income is given by y - C.
Proposition 21 Provided that u (y - ')- pmd > u , imposing a compulsory stress test
(financed by those identified as medium types) yields a Pareto improvement relative to the No-
IMF benchmark or the pooling equilibrium in which no type takes the examination.
Systematic public assessments by the Board of CCL eligibility have been proposed by some
country officials. Proposition 4 rationalizes the proposal. However, the result depends cru-
" IMF. "Review of Contingent Credit Lines", SM/03/64, February 11, 2003, p. 2.
cially on the fact that the No-IMF benchmark considered already has weak and medium types
separating. In that case, countries identified as weak or countries for which the exam is in-
conclusive are indifferent between taking the exam or not if they do not bare the cost. The
countries identified as medium bare the cost not only of their own examination c , but of all
examinations g. Therefore, a Pareto improvement relative to the No-IMF benchmark occurs
when u (Y - L - pmd) > um0 . This is a more stringent version of Condition 2.
If the No-IMF benchmark had weak types pooling with medium types, the introduction of
a compulsory test would end cross subsidization for those countries identified as weak. The
CCL review report by the IMF recognized this possibility: "(...) any regime that involves
eligibility criteria cannot avoid the adverse implication for members that fail to meet them. ":
" This approach may be more appealing to potentially eligible members but it would magnify the
potentially negative impact on members that did not meet that threshold (...)."
2.4 Three types
In the model presented in the previous sections, the cost of the exam c plays a crucial role
in deterring countries from requesting the stress test. In the separating equilibrium, the weak
types do not take the exam because it is costly, and may reveal their weak type with high
probability. In the pooling equilibrium, the medium types do not take the exam because it is
costly and, with high probability , they may still have to underinsure to credibly signal their
type. If we interpret such costs literally as the cost of monitoring and evaluation by the IMF,
there is no reason to believe costs are significant. In this section, I propose an alternative
broader interpretation of the cost of requesting a CCL.
A typical concern shared by most of the emerging economies that were the target of this
facility has been to achieve recognition as stable and reliable economies. For these economies in
their "road to graduation", the decision to come to the IMF is largely determined by the image
they want portrayed to foreign investors. Quoting IMF reports: "Potentially eligible countries
were not confident that a CCL would be viewed as a sign of strength rather than weakness",
"Such request could convey a signal of greater underlying vulnerabilities than the market had
previously perceived (asymmetric information)." The "image" or "reputation" costs associated
with requesting a CCL can potentially be large in magnitude.
In the model of the previous sections, medium types manage to (costly) separate from weak
types in the No-IMF benchmark. Therefore, it does not capture the possibility that applying for
a CCL may reveal the country to be worse than capital markets believed. In order to capture
those costs, I introduce a third type of country. I refer to this new type as a s-trong country
(0 = s) because it is never hit by a shock. The fraction of strong, medium and weak types is
denoted by A', A' and A' respectively. I assume that, conditional on not being strong, the
fraction of weak types is large, i.e. AM  <
Strong countries do not seek insurance because they are not hit by shocks with probability
one. That is, under symmetric information strong types would choose a contract a symm -
(a 1 = 0, a 2 = 0). For simplicity, I assume that strong types behaviorally keep their strategy
fixed at as mm and do not take the IMF stress test if available. This restricts beliefs because a
country trying to get insurance cannot be a strong country:
# (s/a / (0, 0)) = 0
If the setting is only modified to include strong types, the equilibrium is not affected.
Neither the weak nor the medium types would pool with the strong type. Both would rather
be mistaken for the bad type than accept the no insurance contract asymm. In equilibrium,
the strong type optimally chooses not to insure. Given that the fraction of weak types is large
enough (A <1) the medium and weak types get their symmetric information payoff (
Um and u'mm respectively).
I introduce a second modification to the basic setting: I assume there exists a dimension
along which weak and medium countries benefit from being perceived as a strong type. For ex-
ample, countries may have access to uncertain investment projects which are cheaper to finance
for stronger countries. I introduce this into the model in a stylized way. Let P 01-" be the
extra utility received by country i when the belief about its type is given by the probabilities
(0s #, #2) . I denote P as the increase in utility when type i is believed to be type j and
P"h when it is assumed to be either j or h with probabilities AJ and Ah respectively. For
simplicity, I assume that if weak and medium types are identified, they receive no extra benefit:
P = P = 0. Both types benefit from being mistaken for a strong type, so Pmms > PT = 0 and
PIS > Pw = 0. In the context of the investment project, we may think of this as the cross
subsidy of cheaper access to credit. Also I assume that Pm > Pmms > Pms > Pws and Pm' > Ps,.
2.4.1 Interesting case
To capture the "image"/ "reputation" costs, I focus on the case in which the No-IMF bench-
mark consists of medium types pooling with strong types and separating from weak types.
This equilibrium requires two conditions: (1) cross subsidization benefits for the medium type
must compensate for the loss of underinsurance associated with imitating strong types; (2) the
weak type benefits of pooling with medium and strong types must be lower than the cost of
underinsurance. Note that the cost of autarky (no insurance) relative to the liio described in
the previous section is greater for the weak types than for the medium types because they face
shocks with higher probability. That is, we require:
u m (0,0) + PmT 5
'ymm ;> (0,0)+ Pms
There are two cases to distinguish. Consider first the case in which the symmetric infor-
mation payoff for medium types is lower than the payoff obtained through pooling with strong
types (that is, u' (0, 0) + Pms > ummm > ulo). The gains in cross subsidies for medium types
are so large that they have no interest in revealing their type. As a result, the introduction of
a voluntarily, member-requested CCL would prove ineffective (independently of the cost c and
the power of the test -y).
For the rest of the paper, I focus on the case in which the medium type's utility, when pooling
with strong types, is lower than its symmetric information payoff (i.e. umm > Um (0, 0) +
P m8 > u'.). The medium type benefits from revealing its type even at the expense of losing
cross-subsidization. However, the presence of the weak type imposes a negative externality:
medium types can only credibly signal their type by underinsuring. As a result, medium types
prefer no insurance and pool with strong types. The medium economy (the target of the IMF
CCL) has two fundamental signaling concerns: (1) an "upward" concern that the request for
an exam reveals it not to be the strong type, (2) a "downward" concern that after taking the
imperfect test, it might still be confused with the weaker type.
In this case, there is a role for the introduction of an IMF stress test as described in the
previous section. If the IMF could reduce the informational rents resulting from asymmetric
information, generating a Pareto improvement relative to the No-IMF benchmark. To achieve
a Pareto improvement, the test must not to be too costly. I assume that if medium types could
effectively use the test to reveal their type, they would willingly pay the cost. 18
Condition 22 Assume c > 0 satisfies ft'mm U (y - c - pm d) > um (0,0) + Pj.
Provided that the stress test is good enough (-y sufficiently high), there exists a separating
equilibrium wherein medium types take the exam and weak types do not. Medium types can
be identified for taking the exam independently of the result; weak types are identified for
seeking insurance in capital markets after not taking the exam. Each type gets its symmetric
information utility.
Proposition 23 if -y < 1, there is a pure strategy separating equilibrium in which medium
types take the exam and bad types do not. Where
u (y - c - pmd) - u (y - pwd)
u (y - c - pmd) - u (y - c - pu'd)<
If the quality of the stress test is low, there exists an equilibrium in which no country takes
the exam and, in capital markets, medium countries pool with strong countries, separating from
weak ones. The weak types get full insurance and separate from medium and strong types who
get no insurance at all. The medium types benefit from being pooled with strong types. They
obtain u"mm and um (0, 0) + P~m respectively.
If the medium types deviate and take the exam, their type is revealed with probability y and
they receive their symmetric information payoff. 19 However, with probability 1 - 7, the exam
is inconclusive. In this case, the country signals that it is not a strong type, but uncertainty
remains. If 3 (m/Exam, NotRevelation) < A, then liio payoffs are the unique payoffs after
"This condition is analogous to condition 2.
"With income 9 = y - c since the exam has to be paid.
taking the exam. Medium types still incur the costs of separating from weak types. As such,
an upper bound on -y is required for this deviation not to be profitable. The weak type never
deviates by taking the exam, since a payment c is required and the country would still be
identified as a weak type.
Proposition 24 if 0 < -y < ", there is a pooling equilibrium in which neither the weak nor
the medium type take the exam. Where
um (0, 0) - um0 (-c) +Pmms
(y - c - pand) - utn, (-c)
Note that the value of in is bounded above 0 even if the direct cost of the exam c tends to
zero. This happens because the relevant cost for medium types not only includes the monitoring
cost c, but also the loss resulting from revealing they are not the strong types the market
expected (loss in cross-subsidies).
2.5 Conclusions
Stigma concerns deter potential users from approaching liquidity provision facilities. Depository
institutions at the national level and (stronger) emerging economies at the international level
have expressed their concerns that financial markets might view borrowing as a sign of financial
weakness. The inclusion of eligibility prerequisites is a critical feature of the Discount Window 2 0
and of the IMF Contingent Credit Line facility.
Eligibility requirements attempt to reduce concerns that borrowing will be perceived as a
sign of weakness, because only "financially sound institutions"/" countries with strong funda-
mentals" may gain access to such credit. The provision of a "stamp of approval" is expected
to have beneficial effects on financial markets. However, the Fed has documented certain re-
luctance of banks to borrow at the Discount Window (DW) and no single emerging economy
joined the initial version of the Contingent Credit Line (CCL) facility of the IMF.
This papers studies the role of eligibility in providing a stress test that may reduce asym-
metric information. The specific procedures for eligibility determination and monitoring vary
2(After its modification in 2003.
across facilities. I center my attention on the IMF CCL. In order to qualify for the CCL, a
country must make an explicit request to the IMF and be approved by the Board.
The quality of the stress test plays a crucial role to determine the type of equilibria that
may arise. As long as the quality of the stress test is good enough, the introduction of the
exam allows for an equilibrium in which target economies take the exam and weak types do
not. The IMF generates a Pareto improvement relative to the No-IMF benchmark by providing
target economies a cheaper way to separate from weak economies. This equilibrium shows
how the IMF CCL was intended to work and provides rationale for country-requested CCL.
However, economic analysts disagree on the value that a stamp of approval by the IMF may
have. Given low stress test quality, there exists an equilibrium in which no country opts to take
the exam. This equilibrium captures how CCL actually worked. Also, provided that the cost of
the exam is sufficiently low, I show that forcing countries to take the exam2i Pareto dominates
the equilibrium in which no country takes the exam.
I propose a broader interpretation of potential costs associated with requesting a CCL
beyond monitoring costs. A typical concern shared by most of the emerging economies that
were the target of this facility has been to achieve recognition as stable and reliable economies.
"Image" or "reputation" costs can be quite large for these countries. CCL-targeted economies
have two fundamental signaling concerns: (1) an "upward" concern that the request for the
exam will reveal it is not as strong the market anticipated; (2) a "downward" concern that after
taking the imperfect test it might still be confused with a weaker economy. Both concerns play
a role in explaining their decision to refuse the eligibility test.
The results of the paper crucially depend on the No-IMF benchmark in which the imperfect
stress test is introduced. In the two type case, I focused on a No-IMF benchmark in which
target economies for the facility manage to separate from weaker countries by underinsuring.
In the three type case, I considered a benchmark in which the target economies pool with
better countries, separating from weaker countries. Further work should explore the effects of
imperfect stress tests in other settings. Also, research should seek to understand the effect of
IMF mistakes in country evaluations. Finally, it is important to analyze the pros and cons of
making ratings more informative (beyond the current dichotomy join versus not join).
2 And subsidizing the cost of the exam for those countries whose test is uninformative or reveals them weak.
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2.6 Appendix
2.6.1 Proof of Proposition 2
If '< < K 1, there exists a pure strategy equilibrium in which the medium types take the
exam and the bad types do not. That is,
a(w) = NotExam
a(m) = Exam
j3 (w/NotExam) = 1
0 (m/Exam, Re velation) = 0 (m/Exam, Not Re velation) = 1
On equilibrium, the medium and weak types reveal their types and get u (y - c - p m d) and
U (y - pwd) respectively.
If the medium type were to deviate and not take the exam, it would be taken for a weak
type. Still, in capital markets the liio is a lower bound on how much each type can get. The
medium type would get u' and given condition 2, this deviation is not profitable.
If the weak type were to deviate and take the exam, with probability Y its type would be
observe and the payoff would be u (y - c - p'd). With probability 1 - -Y the exam remains
inconclusive, the type is taken for a medium type and the payoff is u (y - c - pmd). The weak
type does not deviate provided that:
u (y - p"d) > yu (y - c - p"d) + (1 - y) u (y - c - p'd)
which imposes a lower bound on 7.
2.6.2 Proof of Proposition 3
If 0 < - < -y , there exists a pure strategy equilibrium in which none of the types takes the
exam a (m) = a (w) = NotExam. Regarding beliefs, we require
3 (m/NotExam) = A
3 (m/Exam, Re velation) = 1 if 0 = m
and we are free to choose 3 (m/Exam, Not Re velation).
I assume that 0 (m/Exam, Not Revealing) <A.
On equilibrium, there is no update in beliefs and as 3 (m/NotExam) < A there is a unique
equilibrium in capital markets given by the liio. The medium and weak types get u',' and
u (y - p'd) respectively.
If the weak type were to deviate and take the exam, with probability y its type would
be observed and the payoff would be u (y - c - p'd). With probability 1 - the exam re-
mains inconclusive and given that / (m/Exam, Not Re vealing) < A the type gets its liio,
u (y - c - pwd). Therefore, the weak type does not deviate
If the medium type were to deviate and take the exam, with probability y its type is learned
and it gets u (y - c - p'd). With probability 1 - y the exam is inconclusive and given that
3 (m/Exam, Not Revealing) < A the medium type gets its liio: u' 0 (-c). For the medium
type not to deviate we require
uM > 0 u (y - c - p'd) + (1 - y)u', (-c)
That is, the exam cannot
What is umA0 (-c)?
ug0 (-c)
0
u (y - c - p"d)
be too revealing (provided the cost c is small).
= maxp'u (y - c - d + a 2) + (1 - p"')a (y - c
* -p a 2 +(1-pm)ai
* p"' U(y - c - d+a2) + (1 -p"')U (y - C - Ce1)
- a1) s.t.
Note that u > urn (-c). Proof:
uli (-c) maxpnu(y-c-d+a2)+(1-p')u(y- c -a) s.t.
0 5 -p'a 2 +(1-p)ai
u(y-c-p'd) > p'u (y - c - d + a2) + (1 - pw) U (y - c - a 1 )
Call di = a1 + c and 2= a 2 - c, we may rewrite the maximization problem as
Uago (-c) max pm (y -d + a2) + (1 - p') U (y - i) s.t.
0102
c < -pm &2 + - p)di
u (y - c - p'd) > pon (y - d + 6 2) + (1 - p")u(y )
A higher value of c makes both restrictions tighter and has no effect on the payoff function.
Using that at the optimum both restrictions must bind we conclude that the inequality must
be strict.
2.6.3 Proof of Proposition 6
If 0 < y < ~U, there exists a pure strategy equilibrium in which none of the types takes the
exam a (m) = a (w) = NotExam. Regarding beliefs, we require
#(m/NotExam) = AW
# (m/Exam, Re velation) = 1 if 0 = m
and we are free to choose # (m/Exam, Not Revelation).
I assume that # (m/Exam, Not Revealing) < A.
On equilibrium, the weak type gets U (y - pwd). If the weak type were to deviate and take
the exam, with probability a its type would be observed and the payoff would be u (y - c - p'd) .With
probability 1 - 7 the exam remains inconclusive and given that #3 (m/Exam, Not Re vealing) <
A the type gets its liio, u (y - c - pwd). Therefore, the weak type does not deviate.
The medium type gets a" (0,0) + Pm"' on equilibrium. If the medium type were to deviate
and take the exam, with probability ^y its type is learned and it gets u (y - c - pm d). With
probability 1 - y the exam is inconclusive and given that # (m/Exam, Not Re vealing) < ~ the
medium type gets its liio: u4 (-c). For the medium type not to deviate we require
um (0, 0)i+ P,' e cnoU (y - c - pmd) + (1 - s) UmO (-c)
That is, the exam cannot be too revealing (provided the cost c is small).
2.7 Appendix II
This appendix summarizes the relevant results in Maskin and Tirole 1992 for the purpose of
this paper. Most steps are borrowed from "The theory of corporate finance", Tirole, 2006.
The borrower (principal) may have type b or b. His type is private information and therefore
is unknown for the lender (agent). The fraction of type b borrowers is A. Let Ub (c) and Ub (c)
denote the two types ' net utilities for arbitrary contractual terms c. Let U1 (c) and U1 (c) denote
the lender's expected profit when contractual terms are c and the borrower turns out to be b
or b, respectively.
Timing: 3 stage game
1. Principal 0 proposes an option contract c (0) = (c, 5) within a set of feasible contracts C.
2. Agent updates beliefs and accepts iff EU/c > 0.
3. If accepted, Principal must choose between c and 5.
Equilibrium definition: a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) in the 3 stage game.
Let an allocation be a pair of type contingent contractual terms (c, 5).
Definition 25 An allocation (c, 5) is incentive compatible if
Ub (c)
Ub(c)
Ub(S)
Ub(c)
Definition 26 An incentive compatible allocation (c, 5) is profitable type-by-type if
U1(c)
U,()
Definition 27 An incentive compatible allocation (c, 5) is profitable in expectation if
AU, (c) + (1 - A)U(5) > 0
where A is the proportion of type b borrowers.
Definition 28 An incentive compatible allocation (c, ) that is profitable in expectation is in-
terim efficient if it is Pareto optimal for the two types of borrower in the set of incentive
compatible profitable in expectation allocations.
Definition 29 Utility Ub (c*) for borrower type b is the low information intensity optimum for
that type if it maximizes type b's utility in the set of incentive compatible, profitable type-by-type
allocations.
Program I (type b)
(c*,*) arg max Ub (c) s.t.(c,2)
Ub (C) 2Ub (a)
Ub (P Ub (C)
U (c) 2 0
U,(d) P 0
Analogously, utility Ub (23) for borrower type b is the low information intensity optimum for
that type if it maximizes type b's utility in the set of IC, profitable type-by-type allocations:
Program I (type b)
(c*, )=arg max U () s.t.
U (C) ( )
Ub ( > Ub (C)
UI (c) 0
U,(a) p 0
Definition 30 The payoff pair [Ub (c*),Ub (b ) is called the low information intensity opti-
mum. We also call the allocation (c*, 2) the low information intensity optimum.
Proposition 31 The allocation (c*, 2*) is itself incentive compatible.
Lemma 32 The borrower can guarantee herself her low information intensity optimum.
Idea of proof: offer (c*, 5*) , then the lenders will break even even whatever their belief about
the borrower's type.
Theorem 33 (Maskin and Tirole 1992) the 3 stage game has a unique Perfect Bayesian equi-
librium if the low information intensity optimum is interim efficient relative to prior beliefs
(A, 1 - A). The borrower then obtains her low information intensity optimum.
Idea of proof: an equilibrium allocation must be incentive compatible and must weakly
Pareto dominate the low information intensity optimum. It cannot however strictly dominate
the low information intensity optimum since the latter is (interim efficient), and so must yield
the same utilities. In the insurance model presented in this paper, the separating allocation we
solved for is the low information intensity optimum and is interim efficient if A < A.
Theorem 34 (Maskin and Tirole 1992) if the low information intensity optimum is not interim
efficient, then the set of equilibrium payoffs for the two types of borrowers is the set of payoffs
that result from an incentive-compatible, profitable-in-expectation allocation that weakly Pareto-
dominate the low information intensity optimum.
Chapter 3
Signaling Concerns, Discount
Window Borrowing and Competing
Liquidity Facilities
Abstract
The financial crisis started in mid 2007 constitutes the most recent challenge for
the discount window facility (DW). At the onset of the crisis, the Federal Reserve saw
little demand for primary credit through its discount window, even after lowering
the discount rate from 100bp to 50bp above the federal funds target. Alternative
liquidity facilities, such as the Federal Home Loan Bank system (FHLB) and the
Term Auction Credit Facility (TAF), took the early lead and were the dominant
sources of liquidity during the crisis.
This paper studies the role of the DW in the presence of competing liquidity
facilities with market determined interest rates. There is stigma attached to bor-
rowing at the DW. Stigma costs are assumed to be fixed costs and therefore banks
borrow at the DW only when the fed funds market is severely tight. When the fed
funds market is "mildly" tight supply adjusts to meet demand solely via the provi-
sion of new funds by alternative facilities. A more attractive DW (lower discount
rate or lower signaling costs) results in higher DW borrowing and a higher fraction
of banks borrowing from the facility. It is also accessed in more states of the world.
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by
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Abstract
I propose an empirical approach based on cross-district data to test for the stigma
hypothesis.Variations in Federal Reserve district characteristics (e.g. number and
size distribution of depository institutions) serve as a proxy for variations in (unob-
servable) signaling costs to test their effect on borrowing at the DW facility.
3.1 Introduction
The discount window (DW) constitutes the longest standing liquidity provision facility by the
US government. Its goal is to function as a safety valve in relieving pressures in reserve markets
arid therefore relieve liquidity strains in depository institutions and the banking system as a
whole. However, depository institutions have expressed their concern that banking supervisors,
other banks, and investors might see borrowing as a sign of financial weakness. According to
a Fed report, "such stigma deterred some institutions from using adjustment credit when doing
so would have been appropriate." Starting in the mid and late 1980s, banks showed a growing
reluctance to borrow at the discount window (Pearce 1993, Peristiani 1998, Dow 2001). Discount
window borrowing declined dramatically and the close relationship between borrowing and the
spread between the federal funds rate and the discount rate (the so-called "borrowing function")
effectively disappeared.
In 2003, the discount window was redesigned in an attempt to reduce market stigma and
costly regulatory monitoring, which were believed to hinder borrowing at the facility (Madigan
and Nelson 2002). Adjustment credit, the previous version of the facility, was characterized
by a below-market discount rate and a requirement that depository institutions borrow only
to meet short term needs after exhausting all available sources of funds. The new version,
in particular the Primary Credit program, was designed to more closely resemble a Lombard
facility. The Primary Credit program provides funds to financially sound depository institutions
at an above-market rate but with very little administration and no restrictions on the use of
the proceeds.
There is no consensus on whether the redesign of the facility achieved its goal. Empirical
studies yield contradicting conclusions depending on the time horizon considered. Furfine 2001
and 2003 study the experience with the Special Lending Facility' (SLF) and the results of the
first three months of the redesigned discount window facility. He concludes that despite the
removal of administrative costs, depository institutions remained hesitant to borrow from the
Fed because stigma could not be eliminated completely.
Allowing for a three year time lapse of the new regime, Artuc and Demiralp 2007 find differ-
A facility similar in design to the new discount window program temporarily established by the Fed to ensure
adequate liquidity provision around Y2K.
ent results. The authors analyze daily borrowings behavior before and after the establishment of
the new facility. They estimate implicit costs of borrowing using the fixed cost model proposed
by Clouse and Dow 1998. They find that stigma substantially decreased and the borrowing
function (i.e. the sensitivity of total DW borrowing to the spread between the fed funds and
the discount rate) became operational again.
The financial crisis started in mid 2007 constitutes the most recent challenge for the DW
facility. At the onset of the crisis, the Federal Reserve received little demand for primary credit
through its discount window, even after lowering the discount rate from 100 basis points to 50
basis points above the federal funds target. Economic analysts interpreted this as evidence of
how signaling concerns still hinder borrowing at the DW facility. Ashcraft, Bech and Frame
2008 (ABF 08) propose an alternative explanation: the presence of an alternative lower cost
government sponsored liquidity facility. The authors document the important role played by
alternative liquidity facilities, like the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) and the Term Auction
Credit Facility (TAF).
The Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) System is a government-sponsored liquidity facility
consisting of 12 cooperatively owned wholesale banks which function as a general source of
liquidity for its member financial institutions. Liquidity is provided through advances (over-
collateralized loans) to members. In order to raise funding, the FHLB system issues debt
instruments (bonds and discount notes). Obligations consolidate borrowing needs of all institu-
tions into joint securities offerings which are sold in capital markets. Members share the funds
raised by the sale of securities and share the obligation to repay. Being a government spon-
sored enterprise, the perception in financial markets is that of an implicit Federal government
guarantee. Overnight advances are priced to compete with the federal funds rate.
The Term Auction Credit Facility (TAF), introduced on December 12, 2007, complements
the DW in providing liquidity to sound depository institutions. The facilities are close substi-
tutes in many respects. Both offer funding to the same set of eligible institutions, against the
same collateral, and using identical haircut calculations. However, the interest rate for the TAF
is determined competitively through an auction as opposed to the posted discount rate for the
DW. 2 The supply of liquidity at market rates, determined by competitive auctions, attempts
2 For each TAF auction, the Federal Reserve announces an amount to be allocated. Eligible financial insti-
to circumvent the stigma associated with the DW.
Figure (3-1) shows total liquidity provision during the last crisis by the Term Auction Credit
facility, the Discount Window facility, and the Federal Home Loan Bank system.3 During
the first four months of the crisis, the FHLB system was the dominant source of government
sponsored liquidity. It was not until December 2007 that the Federal Reserve began to lend
significant amounts, as a result of the introduction of the Term Auction Facility (TAF). The
FHLB remained an important source of liquidity through 2008.4 In addition, several other
liquidity facilities were introduced during the crisis, including the Primary Dealer Credit Facility
(PDCF) and the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF). Quoting ABF 08: " While the FHLB
System was the lowest-cost source of secured term funding for U.S. depository institutions during
fall 2007, the new liquidity facilities created by the Fed in Dec. 2007 complemented FHLB
advances by extending "stigma free" term dollar credit to non-FHLB members including foreign
institutions." Armantier, Ghusels, Sarkar and Shrader 2010 document that during the summer
of 2008 banks preferred to pay, on average, at least 34bp more to borrow from the Fed's Term
Auction Facility than from the discount window.
The Federal Reserve implemented a number of important changes to the primary program
after the financial crisis emerged. On August 17, 2007, the penalty spread was reduced from
100 bp to 50bp, with maturities extended up-to 30 days. On March 16, 2008, the spread was
further reduced to 25bp and maturities extended up-to 90 days. However, borrowing at the
DW remained insignificant until late March 2008.
In this paper, I study the role of the discount window in the presence of competing liquidity
facilities with market determined interest rates, such as the FHLB system or the Term Auction
Facility (TAF). A bank's reserve position is subject to individual and aggregate shocks. Banks
that face a deficiency must borrow at the market determined interest rate or at the discount
window. Accessing the DW involves a direct cost (the posted discount rate) and an indirect cost,
tutions may submit a bid (subject to a maximum amount) consisting of at most two rate-quantity pairs. Bids
are accepted starting with the highest rate submitted until the announced offering amount has been allocated
or until the minimum bid rate is reached. The lowest accepted interest is the "stop-out rate", and is paid by
all partitcipants with awarded bids. There are also differences in maturity, availability frequency, prepayment
options and borrowing limits.
'The FHLB time series is constructed subtracting the value of advances in January 2007.
'In spite of the fact that in the second quarter of 2008, the borrowing costs and advance rates for the FHLB
increased as a result of the association of this government sponsored facility with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
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Figure 3-1: Crisis liquidity provision per facility.
since it may raise concern in the market about the institution's financial condition (a signaling
cost). I assume a key distinction: signaling costs are attached to the discount window but not
to alternative liquidity sources. Signaling costs are fixed costs as in Clouse and Dow 1998 (CD
98) and Artuc and Demiralp 2007 (AD 07). The presence of fixed costs explains instances of
extremely high fed funds rate and heterogeneous behavior across banks with respect to the
discount window.
The total supply of federal funds is given by banks with excess reserves which choose to
lend in the fed funds market, and by the provision of funds by an alternative liquidity facility.
Because the discount window is subject to fixed costs, some banks borrow at the DW only when
the fed funds market is severely tight (as a consequence of large negative aggregate shocks).
When the fed funds market is "mildly" tight (as a result of negative but not too large aggregate
shocks), supply adjusts to meet demand solely via the provision of new funds by an alternative
facility. No bank borrows at the discount window.
As opposed to AD 07, the presence of an alternative liquidity facility makes the aggregate
supply of funds elastic with respect to the interest rate. As a result, given the aggregate shock,
changes in signaling costs and the discount rate affect both equilibrium prices and quantities.
A more attractive facility (lower discount rate or lower signaling costs) results in more total
discount window borrowing and a higher fraction of banks borrowing at the facility. Also, a
more attractive facility is accessed in more states of the world.
The model offers an alternative interpretation of two findings made by Reddy and Shaffer
2007. The authors find that the DW redesign did not significantly change the average level of
aggregate overnight DW borrowing. They interpret this as the higher direct cost of borrowing
(above-market interest rate) offsetting the lower indirect costs (reduced stigma and administra-
tion costs). They also find that the pricing of overnight FHLB system loans did not respond to
the systemic change in the discount rate, concluding that the FHLBs do not view the DW as a
primary competitor in overnight lending. However, these findings are consistent with a period
of mildly tight fed funds markets in which the discount window is not systematically used (e.g.
borrowing due to technical reasons), and the discount rate and signaling costs have no effect on
the equilibrium interest rate. It should be rioted that the authors' sample (from January 10,
2003 to January 1, 2005) included only two instances when the intra-day maximum fed funds
rate exceeded the discount rate.
I propose an empirical approach to test for the stigma hypothesis. The empirical approach
is based on exploiting differences across Federal Reserve districts. Signaling costs are unob-
servable, so we cannot directly test the hypothesis that signaling costs affect discount window
borrowing. However, district characteristics (e.g. number and size distribution of institutions,
variance of shocks, etc.) may function as a proxy for variations in signaling costs to test their
effect on borrowing at the facility.
Individual bank discount window borrowing is strictly confidential. Primary credit data is
published only aggregated across Federal Reserve districts or across several liquidity facilities.
The signaling concern is that market participants may combine this information with bidding
behavior in the federal funds market to infer the identity of institutions borrowing at the
discount window. Consider, for example, cross-district variation in the number of eligible
institutions for primary credit. All things equal, it should be harder to identify a borrowing
bank in a district with more eligible institutions because banks may "hide in the bushes" more
easily. A higher number of eligible institutions may be used as a proxy for lower signaling costs.
Under the identifying assumptions that fixed costs represent signaling costs and the number of
institutions proxies variations in signaling costs across districts, we may test the predictions of
the model. All else equal, districts with more institutions should experience a higher fraction
of banks accessing the facility and higher district average DW borrowing.
The relationship between DW borrowing and the spread between the fed funds rate and the
discount rate should indicate the presence of fixed costs. If borrowing at the government facility
had no indirect costs attached, then the discount rate should function as an upper bound on
the fed funds rate and no discount window borrowing is expected when the fed funds rate falls
below the bound. A fixed cost attached to DW borrowing explains those occasions when the
fed funds rate rises above the discount rate. I study the evolution of the relationship between
DW borrowing and the spread since 2003. I divide the sample into three sub-periods: pre-crisis,
first phase of the crisis, and last phase of the crisis through recovery.
Despite the differences in scale (given the arrival and deepening of the financial crisis), the
pattern is similar in the first two subperiods. When the fed funds rate falls below the discount
rate, discount borrowing is low. When the spread is positive, borrowing increases in the spread.
The figures are consistent with the revival of the borrowing function proposed by Artuc and
Demiralp 2007. The figures suggest the presence of fixed costs attached to DW borrowing. The
last sub-period shows a positive relationship between DW borrowing and the spread. I observe
a new, salient feature in the last phase: there are large amounts of borrowing at negative
spreads. This phenomenon may be explained by banks, with sound credit quality, scaling back
their lending to other banks (e.g. due to increased uncertainty in counterparty risk) in times
of financial turmoil . As a result some institutions may have limited access to those funds and
are forced to borrow from government facilities.
The structure of this paper is as follows: section 2 introduces the model of the discount win-
dow facility with competing liquidity sources and solves for the equilibrium; section 3 compares
predictions of the model to Artuc and Demiralp 2007 and reinterprets the findings by Reddy
and Shaffer 2007; section 4 proposes an empirical approach to test for the stigma hypothesis;
section 5 studies the evolution of the relationship between DW borrowing and the spread since
2003; section 6 concludes. All proofs are included in the appendix.
3.2 The model
I borrow the basic setting from Clouse and Dow 1998 (CD 98) and Artuc and Demiralp 2007
(AD 07). In this setting a bank's reserve position is subject to individual and aggregate shocks.
Banks that face deficiencies are forced to borrow at the federal funds market or the discount
window. Accessing the liquidity facility involves both a variable and a fixed cost.
The bank's reserve position is realized at the beginning of the period and is given by a+u+v;
where a is a constant, u is a shock common to all banks, and v is a bank specific shock. Aggregate
and individual shocks are assumed to be independent symmetric shocks with bounds [-k, k]. I
assume 0 < a < k.
If a bank has positive reserves (a + u + v > 0) it may either lend the reserves at the fed
funds market (at the fed funds rate i), or hold on to the reserves receiving a marginal benefit
' . If the bank is deficient in reserves (a + u + v < 0), it may borrow at the fed funds rate i, or
access the discount window at discount rate id'. The latter involves stigma costs modelled as
a fixed cost P. I assume y < id" throughout the paper.
There is a continuum of banks; the individual shock v indexes the distribution of banks.
Following CD 98 and AD 07, I assume that banks borrowing at the discount window may not
re-lend funds to other banks. Otherwise, given the presence of fixed costs, there would be an
incentive for only one bank to borrow at the discount window and re-lend to all other banks
with deficiencies.o
The total supply of federal funds has two sources: (1) some banks with excess reserves choose
to lend in the fed funds market; (2) there exists an extra source of federal funds which increases
in the interest rate i when the interest rate rises above the marginal benefit y. The extra source
of liquidity is given by the function Ah (i - y) for i > ; with h(0) = 0 and h' (.) > 0. This
extra source of funds is the key departure from CD 98 and AD 07, because it makes the total
federal funds supply an elastic function of the federal funds rate. For a given spread of the fed
funds rate over the banks' marginal benefit i - y, the extra funds going into the market increase
with A. Note that the model encompasses CD 98 and AD 07, which correspond to A = 0.
The extra source of funds represents a competing and complementary liquidity facility, which
"However, it should be noted that after the modification of the Discount Window facility in 2003, Primary
Credit lending imposes no restrictions on the use of the borrowed funds.
allocates funds to the fed funds market when market gets tighten, similar to the Federal Home
Loan Bank system (FHLB) or the Term Auction Facility (TAF). This facility includes market
determined interest rates and is not subject to stigma concerns.
3.2.1 Equilibrium
In this section I characterize the equilibrium of the model. Given the continuum of banks and
that E (v) = 0, the aggregate reserve position is a + u. For each value of the aggregate shock
u, the equilibrium interest rate i* must be such that demand meets supply.
If the aggregate reserve position is positive, a + u > 0, then total positive reserve positions
are greater than total negative reserve positions. Therefore, given that supply is greater than
demand, the federal funds rate is brought down to the marginal value of reserves, i = -. Note
that because -y < id,, there is no bank borrowing at the discount window. There is no borrowing
at the alternative liquidity facility either.
If a + u < 0, fewer funds can be lent than are demanded. As such, the fed funds rate rises
above y (I refer to this situation as a tight market). Consequently, extra funds enter the market
(increasing supply) and some banks may choose to borrow at the discount window (reducing
demand).
I characterize supply and demand in turn. To simplify notation, I define the state variable
x = -a - u. High values of x correspond to large negative aggregate shocks. The federal funds
supply is given by
S (x,iVS) (x)+ S (i)
where S refers to the supply of funds by banks with excess reserves, 6
S(x) = (v - x)dF (v)
and S refers to the extra source of funds
0 if i < -Y
S (0) =
Ah (i - y) if i >
'Actually, S (x) C 0, fx (v - x) dF (v)] if i y and S (x) = 0 if i <-7
Banks in need of funds lie in the interval -k < v < x. Within this interval, some borrow at
the fed funds market and some may go to the discount window. Given the fixed costs, a bank
prefers to either borrow entirely in the market or at the discount window. The total cost of
market borrowing for a bank with shock v is given by -i (v - x). The total cost of borrowing
at the discount window is given by p - idw (v - x). When i < P + id,, even the bank withat ~~~~~k+x ,ee  kwt
the worse shock prefers borrowing at the market to borrowing at discount window. Therefore,
demand is given by the function
)f)= f <v-xdFv) iP +id
D (v, () -
_ _P (v - x)dF (v) ifi> P idwi-,dw
As shocks get worse, there are three effects affecting demand. First, some banks shift
from supplying to borrowing fed funds. Given that the marginal bank does not demand nor
supply funds, the effect of a marginal worsening in the shock x is negligible. Second, each bank
that continues to borrow at the fed funds market will demand more funds, increasing demand.
Finally, provided that the market is tight (x > 0) and that the interest rates are sufficiently
high (i > idw+ x ), some banks exit the fed funds market to borrow at the discount window.
This effect reduces demand for fed funds. I assume that the second effect dominates the latter.
Therefore, demand weakly increases when the market is tighter.
Condition 35 7 Assume for x > 0 and i > idw +
xk
F (x) - F x > X
In a tight market (x > 0) there are fewer funds to be lent than are demanded, which puts
upward pressure on interest rates (that rise above y). Given fixed costs, no bank exits the
fed funds market to borrow at the discount window unless the interest rate is high enough
> -P id) . Thus, there exists a region in which supply adjusts to meet demand solely
via the provision of new funds entering the market S (i) > 0.
Potentially, a large inflow of funds from alternative sources could keep the interest rate suffi-
This condition is satisfied for the uniform distribution which is used in CD 98 and AD 07.
ciently low, deterring banks from borrowing at the discount window for any shock x. Through-
out this paper, I assume that the alternative source of funds S (i) allows for borrowing at the
discount window given certain values of x. This condition requires an upper bound on A.
Condition 36 Assume that Ah (idu) + P - -<) < k - a.
As a result, a tight market (x > 0) requires that we distinguish two regions. In the first
region, when the shock is not too large, demand for fed funds is met by banks with excess
reserves and by funds from an alternative liquidity source. The interest rate rises above -y but
not enough for banks to borrow at the discount window. I refer to this region as Region 1.
If the market tightens enough, in spite of the provision of funds from the alternative liquidity
source, the interest rate becomes high enough inducing some banks to borrow at the discount
window facility. This is the case whenever the aggregate shock is large enough x > T, where T
solves
S P Pidw Ah k ±idw )
-= $ + ia = Ah + i -
Given condition 2, there exists a unique value T that satisfies this expression. The region
without discount window borrowing expands with the signaling cost P, the discount rate id"
and the parameter A. The region shrinks with the cost of funds -y. Next, I analyze equilibrium
determination in Region 1 (x E [0,T]) and Region 2 (x > T).
Proposition 37 1 is increasing in P, id" and A, and decreasing in -Y.
Region 1; x E [0, j]
When the fed funds market is mildly tight (x E [0, T]) there is no discount window borrowing.
In this case, the equilibrium interest rate i* (x) is given by
S(i*) = D (x) - S (x)
or equivalently
Ah (i*-) x
The equilibrium interest rate i* (x) is increases with shock x and satisfies 7 < i* (x) <
P +dw
Region 2: x > iz
When the fed funds market tightens severely (x > T), some banks exit the market to borrow
at the discount window. The equilibrium interest rate i* (x) satisfies
S(X)+S(i*)=- (v-x)dF(v)
Pidw
or equivalently
k
Ah (i* - f) = (v - x) dF (v)
P d4*_-ide,
In this region, the equilibrium interest rate satisfies i* (x) > P + id,. The mass of banks
exiting to the discount window lies in the interval [_k, x - ',d_] ,with total discount window
borrowing given by
DW* (x) - dw(v - x)dF (v)
-k
As aggregate conditions worsen the supply of bank funds decreases and, given condition 1,
demand for funds weakly increases. As a result, the equilibrium interest rate i* (x) and equi-
librium discount window borrowing DW* (x) are both increasing in x and therefore, positively
related in region 2. The mass of banks borrowing at the discount window F x - , also
increases with shock x.
Note that at T, the equilibrium interest is sufficiently high for banks with the worst individual
shocks to consider borrowing at the discount window. That is, at the threshold between the
two regions, i* (1) = + idw and -i.)dW -k. Figure (3-2) illustrates equilibrium
prices and quantities- when shocks are uniformly distributed and the extra source of funds is
linear S (i) = A (i - y) for i > 7.
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Figure 3-2: Example: u, v U [-2, 2], P = 3, id' 0
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3.3 Comparative Statics
In this section, I analyze and relate the model results to other relevant papers that study the
new discount window facility established in January 2003. Consider the discount window model
proposed by Artuc and Demiralp 2007. The authors' framework yields counterintuitive results
due to the inelastic federal funds supply built in the model. Under such conditions, given the
aggregate shock x, the signaling cost P, the discount rate idw (provided that id, > y) and the
marginal benefit 'y (provided id, > y) have no effect on the mass of banks accessing the DW,
the total amount borrowed at DW, nor on the states of the world in which the DW is used.
Also, the marginal benefit -y (identified as the target rate by the authors in their empirical
estimation) has no effect on the equilibrium interest rate when the market is tight.
In AD 07, aggregate shock x entirely determines the supply of funds in the fed funds markets.
In equilibrium, total demand must equal total supply. Therefore, total demand at the fed funds
market is also entirely determined by the shock x. For a given x, variations in P, id, or -Y are
accommodated solely by the equilibrium interest rate; there are no quantity effects.
After the introduction of an alternative liquidity facility, the federal funds total supply is
no longer inelastic, so variations in p, idu, and y have both price and quantity effects. A
more attractive facility (lower id, or P) results, for each x > T, in more total discount window
borrowing and a higher fraction of banks borrowing at the facility. Also, a more attractive
facility is accessed in more states of the world (lower T).
When the opportunity cost of funds -increases,' liquidity provision by the alternative
liquidity facility is reduced (for each value of the interest rate) and banks with excess reserves
require higher payments to lend at the fed funds market. As a result, a higher value of -y reduces
supply and increases equilibrium interest rates. Because some banks borrow at the DW, the
effect on the fed funds rate is lower in region 2. The following propositions summarize the
comparative statics of the model.
Proposition 38 If A, P > 0, for each value of the shock x, the federal funds rate i* (x) is
* decreasing in A, increasing in -y and independent of id,, P in Region 1: x G [0, |.
'I continue to assume y < i
o decreasing in A, increasing in y, id,, P in Region 2: x > I
Proposition 39 If A, P > 0, for each value of the shock x, the provision of funds by the
alternative liquidity facility Ah (i* (x) - y) is
* independent of A, ', ia, P in Region 1: x c [0, z|
* decreasing in -y and increasing in A, idu, P in Region 2: x > T
Proposition 40 If A, P > 0, for each value of the shock x, total discount window borrowing
DW* (x) and the ,fractions of banks accessing the facility are
* zero in Region 1: x G [0, ].
" increasing in -y and decreasing in A, idw, P in Region 2: x > I
The model in AD 07 also predicts that the sensitivity of DW borrowing to the fed funds
rate a0j (x) is decreasing in the fixed cost of accessing the facility P. With the introduction
of the extra source of liquidity, the relationship is no longer straightforward. Consider the case
in which the shocks are uniformly distributed (u, v - U [-k, k|) and the additional source of
funds is linear S (i) = A (i - In this case, the sensitivity of DW borrowing to the fed funds
rate ai* (x) is decreasing in the fixed cost of accessing the facility P provided that A is not
too large.9
The model in this paper suggests an alternative interpretation of the empirical findings
by Reddy and Shaffer 2007, who study the effects of the re-design of the discount window
facility. The authors find that "the new program did not significantly change the average level
of aggregate overnight DW borrowing (...) consistent with a roughly equal offset between the
higher direct cost of borrowing and lower indirect costs under the new policy." In terms of
the model, the authors interpret modifications to the facility as an increase in the discount
rate T idw and a decrease in the non-price cost I P. These forces push DW borrowing in
opposite directions in Region 2. However, an alternative interpretation may characterize the
period following the modification of the facility as having mild aggregate shocks that lead to no
"The actual condition is given by that 4k A < 1.
systematic borrowing at the discount window (Region 1). The observed borrowing may have
occurred due to technical reasons.'() In this region, the discount rate id' and the fixed cost
P have no effect on equilibrium interest rates. It should be noted that in the authors' sample
(from January 10, 2003 to January 1, 2005) the intra-day maximum fed funds rate exceeded
the discount rate idu) only twice.
This alternative story would modify the authors' conclusion that "several simple tests in-
dicated that the pricing of overnight Federal Home Loan Banks system loans did not respond
to the systemic change in the discount rate, suggesting that the FHLBs do not view the DW as
a primary competitor for their lending overnight". We may think of the FHLB system as an
alternative liquidity facility. Even though changes in id' and P have no effect on equilibrium
interest rates i* in Region 1, the alternative liquidity facility and the DW facility may still
compete.
3.4 Empirical test proposal
Many economists have argued that the "stigma" attached to borrowing at the Discount Win-
dow explains banks' reluctance to use the facility. The argument is straightforward from a
theoretical point of view, but empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis remains elusive.
Empirical research regarding discount window borrowing has been limited because individual
bank discount window borrowing is strictly confidential. Primary credit data is published only
aggregated across Federal Reserve districts or across several liquidity facilities ( i.e. primary,
secondary and seasonal credit and other liquidity programs)." The signaling concern is that
market participants may combine this information with the bidding behavior in the federal
funds market to infer the identity of borrowing institutions.
Furfine 2001/03 and Armantier, Ghusels, Sarkar and Shrader 2010 (AHSS 10 hereafter) are
notable exceptions. Furfine 2001 documents that whenever market interest rates rose noticeably,
borrowing in the federal funds markets at 150 or more basis points above target dwarfed lending
E.g. technical difficulties with the Fedwire payment system or the realization of unexpected transactions
late in the day, that may not leave sufficient time to find a suitable counterparty in the fed funds market.
The pre-2003 version of the facility published adjustment credit data at a distric level (see Mitchell and
Pearce 91).
at a facility12 similar in design to the new DW that charged 150bp over the fed funds target.
Furfine 2003 finds that borrowing at the new DW was significantly lower than predicted using
interbank borrowing behavior past data. Even at less attractive interest rates, the volume of
fed funds borrowing was several times larger than DW borrowing. AHSS 10 find that during
the summer of 2008 banks preferred to pay on average at least 34bp more to borrow from the
Fed's Term Auction Facility than from the discount window.
Given the DW's economic importance, it is crucial to obtain rigorous and robust evidence
for the existence of stigma. The non-disclosure policy by the Fed has been challenged recently
by various news organizations. During the last year, Bloomberg News and Fox News have
brought lawsuits against the Federal Reserve because it refuses to provide discount window
documentation under the Freedom of Information Act. In March 2010, the federal appeals
court ruled that the Fed must disclose documents related to individual borrowing from DW.
However, in May 2010, Fed representatives asked the federal appeals court to reconsider the
ruling because "banks would be less likely to use the DW (...) if they know their use would be
made public", that is "the disclosure of the identity of financial institutions (...) will severely
undermine the board's ability to implement lending programs critical to the economy (...) ".
In this section, I propose an empirical approach to test for stigma. The empirical approach
is based on exploiting differences across districts." According to the model, signaling costs
affect discount window borrowing. Signaling costs are unobservable so the hypothesis cannot
be tested directly. However, district characteristics (e.g. number and size distribution of insti-
tutions, variance of shocks, etc.) affect the ability of market participants to identify institutions
borrowing at the DW. Therefore, we may use district characteristics as a proxy for variations
in signaling costs in order to test how these affect borrowing at the facility.
Consider, for example, cross district variation in the number of eligible institutions for
primary credit. All else equal, it should be harder to identify a borrowing bank in a district
with more eligible institutions because banks can "hide in the bushes" more easily. Higher
numbers of eligible institutions may proxy for lower signaling costs. Under the identifying
"The Special Lending Facility (SLF) was a temporary facility that operated between October 1, 1999 and
April 7, 2000.
"Data disaggregated at a district level is currently confidential. However, it represents a useful middle-step
to obtain solid evidence for stigma without the disclosure of individual bank borrowing data.
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assumptions that fixed costs represent signaling costs and that number of institutions proxies
for variations in signaling costs across districts, we may test the model's predictions. According
to the model, we should expect the following in districts with more institutions:
" the fraction of banks and the probability that a bank will access the DW is higher,
" district average DW borrowing is higher,
" the sensitivity of average DW borrowing to the fed funds rate (9 ") is higher (under
certain conditions, see section 3)
We may also use heterogeneity in bank size as a proxy for signaling costs. In order to
conduct the test, I consider a variation of the specification proposed by Artuc and Demiralp.
The authors use daily data to estimate pre and post 2003:
DWt = ao + aist + 6 2 Xt + Et
where DWt denotes daily aggregate primary credit at the Federal level, st is the spread between
the fed funds rate and the discount rate, and Xt is a vector of other controls. 14 They find that,
after the modifications of the DW facility in 2003, the borrowing function is again effective, i.e.
their estimate for a1 is positive and significant.
To test the stigma hypothesis, I extend the time series specification into a panel. Let DWit
be discount window borrowing in district i at date t.To proxy for signaling costs, I use the
number of institutions per district (NUMIt) and the within district depository institution size
variance (a,). I control for total depository institutions assets in each district and use the same
vector of controls as in Artuc and Demiralp Xit. The specification to estimate is given by
DWi1
NUM,= 0 0 + 1NUM, +02i +3SIZEi +4 sit +3 5 (sit * NUMi )+ 6 (sit * Oi + Xit +Eit
'The vector of controls Xt includes: the spread between the intra-day maximum fed funds rate and the fed
funds target when higher than 1 bp, the spread between the fed funds rate at the close of the day and the fed
funds target, the spread between the fed funds rate and the fed funds target on the previous day, the log of
required operating balances, a dummy for the last day of the maintenance period, a dummy for special pressure
days, a dummy for Fedwire extension days, the intraday fed funds volatility and a time trend.
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The model, subject to the identifying assumptions stated above, predicts positive coefficients
for 01 and /32. Empirical estimation would allow to identify if the borrowing function is still
effective at the district level (P4 > 0) or if it is a result of aggregation across districts. Finally,
subject to certain conditions (see section 3), the model predicts positive coefficients for the
interaction terms (35 and #36)
3.5 Evolution of the borrowing function
In this section, I study the evolution of the relationship between DW borrowing and the spread
between the fed funds rate and the discount rate since 2003. This relationship should indicate
the presence of fixed costs.
The discount window facility is designed to place an upper bound on the rates at which
institutions lend to one another overnight, reducing the volatility of the overnight interest rate,
which is typically the rate targeted by the central bank. If borrowing at the government facility
is not associated with any indirect costs, then the discount rate should work as an upper bound
on the fed funds rate and no discount window borrowing is expected when the fed funds rate
falls below the bound.
A fixed cost (e.g. stigma costs) associated with borrowing at the facility explains instances
when the fed funds rate rises above the discount rate. Fixed costs might also explain heteroge-
neous behavior across banks towards the discount window. Still, we expect no discount window
borrowing when the fed funds rate is below or slightly above (Region 1 in terms of the model)
the discount rate. In practice, some noise is expected because not all depository institutions
are eligible for DW borrowing at each moment in time, and discount window borrowing may
be triggered by non-systematic reasons (e.g. technical difficulties in the "Fedwire" system).
I focus on the relationship between DW borrowing and the spread between the intra-day
maximum fed funds rate and the discount rate. Wednesday's primary credit at the federal
level provided by the Fed Board and interest rate data provided by the NY Fed is used in the
construction of the figures. I divide the sample in three sub-periods: pre-crisis, first phase of
the crisis, and last phase of the crisis through recovery.
Figures (3-3) and (3-4) depict the relationship between borrowing and the spread from
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January 15, 2003 until August 15, 2007 and from August 22, 2007 until October 8, 2008
respectively. Despite the differences in scale (possibly due to the arrival and deepening of the
financial crisis), the pattern is the same in both figures. When the fed funds rate falls below
the discount rate, discount borrowing is low. When the spread is positive, borrowing at the
facility increases with the spread. The figures are consistent with the revival of the borrowing
function proposed by Artuc and Demiralp 2007. The figures suggest the presence of fixed costs
attached to DW borrowing.
The last period, corresponding to October 15, 2008 until April 7, 2010 is shown in Figure
3-5. DW borrowing still shows a positive relationship with the spread. However, the large
amount of borrowing at negative spreads (when the discount rate is above the federal funds
rate) is the salient feature of the figure. This piece of evidence cannot be explained by the
model in this paper as it stands. A possible explanation may be that in times of financial
turmoil, banks with sound credit scale back their lending to other banks (e.g. due to increased
uncertainty in counterparty risk). As a result, some institutions may have limited access to
those funds and be forced to borrow from government facilities.
In terms of the model, we may think that a fraction of the banks with very negative reserve
positions (a + u + v < b < 0) must borrow directly at the discount window (e.g. because banks
with positive reserve positions do not want to transact with them). As aggregate shocks worsen,
more banks are forced to exit the fed funds market. These banks borrow at the facility even
if the spread is negative. Also, worse aggregate shocks reduce the supply of funds and (under
certain assumptions) increase the demand for funds, putting upward pressure on the interest
rate. These results explain the positive correlation between the interest rate and positive
discount window borrowing at negative spreads.
3.6 Conclusion
The discount window is designed to function as a safety valve, relieving pressure on reserves
markets, liquidity strains on depository institutions, and the banking system as a whole. In
2003, the facility was redesigned to reduce market stigma and costly regulatory monitoring,
which many believe hindered borrowing at the facility (Madigan and Nelson 2002). The new
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Figure 3-3: Pre-crisis period.
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Figure 3-4: Initial phase of the crisis.
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Figure 3-5: Last phase of the crisis and recovery.
version, in particular the Primary Credit program, provides funds to financially sound deposi-
tory institutions at an above market rate but with very little administration and no restrictions
on the use of the proceeds.
There is no consensus on whether the redesign of the facility has achieved its goal. Empirical
studies yield different conclusions depending on the time period considered. The financial crisis
started in mid 2007 constitutes the most recent challenge for the facility. At the onset of the
crisis, the Federal Reserve saw little demand for primary credit through its discount window,
even after lowering the discount rate from 100 basis points to 50 basis points above the federal
funds target. Many economic analysts interpreted this as evidence of how signaling concerns
still hinder borrowing at the facility. Alternative liquidity facilities like the Federal Home Loan
Bank (FHLB) and the Term Auction Credit Facility (TAF) took the early lead and were the
dominant sources of liquidity.
This paper proposes a model of the DW facility that incorporates both the notion of stigma
and competing liquidity facilities with market determined interest rates. Within the paper,
stigma costs are assumed to be fixed costs. Therefore, banks borrow at the DW only when
the fed funds market is severely tight. When the fed funds market is "mildly" tight supply
adjusts to meet demand solely via the provision of new funds by the alternative facilities. A
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more attractive discount window (lower discount rate or lower signaling costs) results in higher
total discount window borrowing and a higher fraction of banks borrowing at the facility. It is
also accessed in more states of the world.
This paper proposes an empirical approach based on cross-district data to test for stigma.
Variations in Federal Reserve district characteristics (e.g. number and size distribution of
depository institutions) are used as a proxy for variations in (unobservable) signaling costs to
test their effect on borrowing at the DW facility. Districts with more institutions should yield
a higher fraction of banks accessing the facility and higher DW district average borrowing.
The data needed to perform such test is currently confidential.15 The release of information
aggregated at a district level represents a major step in the pursue of rigorous and robust
evidence for the existence of stigma.
On the theoretical side, the reasons why accessing the DW may send a worse signal than
borrowing above the discount rate on the market are still not fully understood. Ennis and
Weinberg (2009) suggest that borrowing at the DW may be observed by participants other than
the credit market who may interpret borrowing at the facility as a negative signal. However, it
is hard to justify why alternative government liquidity facilities like the TAF are not subject to
the same scrutiny. Theoretical efforts should focus on understanding the consequences in terms
of stigma of posted-rates versus market-determined-rates liquidity facilities.
'The period of response to my Freedom of Information Act request (No. 2010100287) submitted in April 2010
has been extended twice and the answer is still pending.
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3.7 Appendix
3.7.1 Existence of T
Given condition 2, there exists a value T > 0 such that S (z, kf + id) - ( )
Proof: Let 4< (x) = 5 (x) - (x) + 5 + idw), then
b(x =0) = 5 +id" >0
b(x) = s(x)-' (x)-5' +id"w ) <0
(k +x (k+ X)2
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therefore, 4) (x = k - a) < 0. As <D (x) is continuous, there exists a value T > 0 such that
S(. P + idw) DQ().
3.7.2 Comparative statics
Restrict attention to x > T.
. Interest rate
i* (x) satisfies
And
(v - x)dF (v) ±(i*)= 0
. _idw)
og F(k) -F (x P f (X - ._P
5 (i*) + 3f (x
- d )
which is positive given condition 1.
Also,
(i* dw) f (X
P 
x(* -idu) f (
j* idw)
-
5) + iid (*)
* Discount window borrowing
DW* (x) is given by
DW* (x) = -
P f
i*(x) -iU 
P Oi*
+ 2(i* (x) -idw)2pJx
+F X
Given that a * > 0, we get aV* > 0.
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> 0
P
1-k
(v - x)dF (v)
&DW*
(x9
a) + 5 i 2"' + ) < D (x = k - a), andAlso, condition 2 may be written as S (k
-
-F(-k)
i* (X) - iOw
P
i* (X)- idw'
Let b* (x) x - ,banks with v in [-k, b* (x)] borrow at the discount window and
Ob_ i* - i" - P 1
aP (i* - idw) 2
The numerator is given by
S-dw -P 
-
i* idwJ
dw 1 >0
- ._ ) +-i*5idw (i*)j
And therefore the higher the fixed cost P, the fewer banks go to the DW W% < 0.
Using the result, we conclude total discount window borrowing (for a given x) is decreasing
in P.
ODW*
OP - (b* x) f (b*) < 0Op
3.7.3 Uniform example
Assume that individual shocks are uniformly distributed v~U [-k, k] and S (i*) is linear Ah (i - 7) -
A (i - y). In this case,
Oi* 1 k - x
,x 2k + p2
ODW* 1 [ P2  i
Ox 2k (i* (X) _ide33 8x + x + kj
P 1
9i* (i*-i dw) 2k
0P p 2  1
i7dw72 k
Then:
OD W* QDWV*=wax
Oi* a*
1 P 2
k - x k - x (i* - idw)3
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P X
(i--id.',) f (
f, x X
Compute:
ap
x+k- ,,&i* 2 P
S (i*) +k-x OP k-x(* -idw) 3
3 1 P3
2kk-x(i*-idw) 6 p2 +
If 5 (i*)' = A = 0 we obtain the result in AD 07: the sensitivity of DW borrowing to the
fed funds rate is decreasing in P.
OP
If 5 (Z*)' = A then
9P
I P
< 0
k - x (* - idw)3
1 + 4k (i'd--
k-x k-x P7-
(i -d ) (i*d-idw) )
P + 2
The sensitivity of DW borrowing to the fed funds rate is decreasing in P provided that
4k pi* A < 1.
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